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CLAWBACKS:  
PROSPECTIVE CONTRACT MEASURES  
IN AN ERA OF EXCESSIVE  
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND PONZI SCHEMES 
Miriam A. Cherry 
Jarrod Wong*
INTRODUCTION 
Months after insurance giant American International Group (AIG) 
faltered and the federal government provided financial assistance to keep 
the company afloat,1 executive compensation and bonus practices at the 
company came under scrutiny.2  Taxpayers balked when evidence came to 
light that large bonuses were being paid to executives — the same 
executives, in certain instances, who had been responsible for AIG’s 
losses.3  The disconnect between AIG’s huge losses and the multi-million 
dollar bonus payments is a striking example of “pay without performance,” 
a phenomenon that Professors Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk documented 
in their book of the same name.4  Responding to public outrage,5 the House 
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1 See William Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, (forthcoming 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346552 (describing circumstances surrounding AIG’s 
almost-bankruptcy and the subsequent bailout).  Various sources have been tracking the recipients of government 
bailout money.  See, e.g. ProPublica, Show Me the TARP Money, http://www.propublica.org/special/show-me-
the-tarp-money (last visited Mar. 26, 2009); Matthew Ericson, et al, Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table. 
2 See, e.g. Deborah Solomon, Uproar Over Geithner’s Role in Bonuses Could Vex Rescue, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 19, 2009, at A5.  
3 Randall Smith & Liam Pleven, Some Will Pay Back AIG Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A1 
(describing how certain members of AIG’s Financial Products group — responsible for a great deal of the losses 
— had received bonuses, but that some, under mounting public pressure, had decided to repay them). 
4 LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
5 See, e.g. Liam Pleven, et al., AIG Faces Growing Wrath Over Payouts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009 at A1; 
Jonathan Weisman, et al., Congress Looks to a Tax to Recoup Bonus Money, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, A1, at 
A2 (quoting Republican Senator Charles Grassley as saying that AIG’s managers were to “take that deep bow and 
say ‘I’m sorry’ and then either do one of two things; resign or go commit suicide.”); Michael M. Phillips, Outrage 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460104
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of Representatives sought to impose a retroactive marginal taxation rate of 
90 percent on the AIG bonuses (as of the date of this writing, the bonus tax 
had passed in the House of Representatives, but not the Senate).6  During 
the debate over the bonus tax, both legislators and media alike described the 
pending bill as a “clawback” provision.7
The same term — “clawback” — was used to refer to remedies 
potentially available to defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme.8  For over a 
decade, former director of NASDAQ Bernard Madoff had been pretending 
to operate a hedge fund that turned out to be one immense house of cards.9
The fraud robbed investors, including some charitable institutions, of 
billions of dollars10 and created a crisis of confidence in the capital 
markets.11  In Madoff’s fund, there was in reality no investment strategy to 
provide “hedges” against typical forms of risk.  Indeed, there did not even 
appear to have been any trading of stocks for over a decade.12 Rather, as in 
Overflows on Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4 (describing 
protests and pervasive anger among the public as well as in the House of Representatives, where “Members of the 
House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises mentioned their 
outrage at . . . . [AIG] 18 times. . . . [a]nd that was during 45 minutes of opening remarks, even before the 
immediate target of their outrage, AIG Chief Executive Edward M. Liddy, entered the room.”); John 
Christoffersen, Protestors Visit AIG Officials’ Lavish Conn. Homes, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009 (discussing 
middle-class protestors who visited executives homes in hopes of convincing them to share by returning their 
bonuses; also discussing that certain executives receiving the bonuses had received death threats).   
6 To Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received from Certain TARP Recipients, H.R. 1586, 111th
Cong. (2009) (passed House of Representatives, Mar. 19, 2009); see also Gregg Hitt & Aaron Lucchetti, House 
Passes Bonus Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at A1.   The legality of such a tax is questionable, not only 
because of its retroactive nature, but also because targeting specific companies and individuals creates potential 
constitutional issues, i.e. bill of attainder.  As of the time of this writing, the bonus tax is still being considered, 
but no action has been taken so far in the Senate. These issues are explored further in the section on AIG in the 
bailout, see infra, Part I(2).  Although the constitutional issues are interesting in their own right (and the later 
portion of the article attempts some preliminary analysis) — they are not our main focus in this article.  Instead, 
we are more concerned with writing clawback provisions into contracts prospectively and examining the 
consequences of their inclusion on contract law.   
7 In the intervening months, other developments, including the appointment of Kenneth Feinberg as Special 
Master or “Compensation Czar” for TARP recipients, and the focus on passing a “Say on Pay” shareholder vote  
have taken more central places in the government’s policy toward executive compensation.  See Press Release, 
U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance 
(June 10, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/ tg165.htm.; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of 
Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg163.htm.  See also Louise Story & Stephen Labaton, Overseer of Big Pay is 
Seasoned Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/11feinberg.html.  These current developments are further 
discussed, infra, Part I (2).  
8 See, e.g., Jane J. Kim, As ' Clawback ' Suits Loom, Some Investors Seek Cover, WALL ST. J., March 12, 
2009, at C3. 
9 Some estimates place investor losses in the Madoff fraud in the range of $50 billion to $64.8 billion.  The 
difference in estimates represents the amount of principal invested plus the phony trading profits that clients were 
told they had accrued. See Aaron Lucchetti & Tom Lauricella, Investors Were Told They Had a Total of $64.8 
Billion, WALL ST. J., March 12, 2009, at A2. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g. Robert Frank, et al., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2009, at 
A1. 
12 See, e.g. Amir Efrati & Robert Frank, Madoff Set to Plead Guilty to 11 Felonies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 
2009, at A1 (describing lack of trading for over a decade). 
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a textbook Ponzi scheme, the early investors were bought off with the 
money from the later investors.13  In turn, the payouts to the early investors 
were relied upon as proof of profitability to convince later investors that 
returns were legitimate.  Because Madoff and his “hedge fund” are now 
insolvent, the question has arisen as to whether the bankruptcy trustee may 
bring a “clawback” action on behalf of the later investors to recover the 
profits of the early investors.14
In recent months, Congress, the media, and other commentators have all 
employed the term “clawback” to describe a stunningly broad variety of 
contractual provisions, legislative enactments, and legal remedies.  This 
leads to a series of questions surrounding so-called clawback provisions.  
First, what constitutes a “clawback”?15  Are provisions in the bailout law 
dealing with AIG or the remedies in Ponzi schemes clawbacks, or 
something else entirely?  Why are the current remedies in these contexts 
inadequate?16  Why are these retroactive remedies so difficult to implement 
under current law?  Going forward, how might prospective inclusion of 
clawback provisions and a robust interpretation of those provisions be 
desirable?  What effect would clawback provisions have on other matters of 
well-settled contract doctrine that deal with allocation of risk?17  This 
Article aims to provide a framework for answering these questions, while 
using current situations at the forefront of the current financial crisis as 
salient examples.  Specifically, we discuss executive compensation, as 
highlighted in the cases of AIG and Merrill Lynch, and Ponzi schemes, as 
most recently illustrated by the multi-billion dollar fraud in the Madoff 
hedge fund, both of which involve the controversial effort to impose 
clawbacks retroactively.      
In this Article, we explore and develop the doctrine of clawbacks.  We 
define “clawback” as a theory for recovering benefits that have been 
conferred under a claim of right, but that are nonetheless recoverable 
because unfairness would otherwise result.  This definition includes both 
retroactive clawbacks — those that like the (pending) 90% tax on bonuses 
are imposed after the contractual right to the bonuses have arisen and the 
benefits have been conferred, and prospective clawbacks — those that are 
introduced into contracts before the claim of right to the benefits has arisen.  
For example, some companies, like Dell, are prospectively writing 
13 See, e.g Tom Lauricella, et al., Madoff used U.K. Office in Cash Ploy, Filing Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 
2009, at C1 (describing criminal charges against Madoff); Chad Bray & Amir Efrati, Prosecutors Target Madoff 
Cash, Bonds and Homes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at C3 (describing efforts to track Madoff’s assets and high 
burden that Ruth Madoff will face in proving the homes were purchased without the benefit of tainted assets).  
14 See Kim, supra note 8. 
15 The term “clawback” has been used in a somewhat casual way to describe any effort at recoupment of 
losses.  In Part III of the Article we discuss a more precise definition of the term in greater detail.  See Part III, 
infra.   
16 See Part III(B), infra. 
17 See Part III(C), infra. 
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provisions into their executive compensation contracts that would recover 
or cancel bonus awards in the event that the company must restate its 
financial results.18
As we will explain further, the structure of clawbacks indicates that they 
operate more effectively if they are prospective, rather than retroactive.   
Accordingly, we suggest writing prospective clawback terms into contracts 
directly, or implying them through default rules where possible, for 
example through potential amendments to the law of securities regulation.    
The Article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of clawback provisions 
in executive compensation contracts.  Part II moves to examine clawback 
clauses in the context of Ponzi schemes, primarily through a study of the 
Madoff hedge fund fraud.  Next, Part III draws these strands together by 
discussing the definition of clawbacks, as well as the doctrinal implications 
of clawback clauses within the panoply of contractual remedies.  
Ultimately, we make the argument that clawback clauses will be an 
effective measure to avoid some of the predicaments in which shareholders 
and investors are currently embroiled.    
I. CLAWBACK PROVISIONS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Excessive executive compensation in United States companies has long 
been a problematic corporate governance issue,19 and one, that despite many 
reform proposals has been seemingly resistant to change.20  From an 
international perspective, the United States has a larger discrepancy 
between the amount paid to top executives and the average worker than 
many countries in Europe.21  While there has been much concern about the 
problem of excessive executive compensation — from both corporate 
governance and social equality perspectives22 — and there has been much 
discussion about potential solutions,23 the problem remains unsolved.  The 
18 See Appendix A, infra. 
19 Much of the Delaware caselaw on everything from fiduciary duty to shareholder voting has arisen from 
disputes over executive compensation.  See, e.g. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
20 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4.   
21 Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and if So, What if Anything Should be Done about It?, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009) (describing larger pay packages received by American CEOs when compared with their 
foreign counterparts).  This discrepancy may perhaps be a result of the comparatively larger role of labor in 
foreign corporate governance process.  Some figures, circa 2003, seem to put the gap at 500 times that of the 
average worker at the company.  CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61; 
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MIRIAM A. CHERRY, GLOBAL ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 202 (2008). 
22 See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585, 
586 (2007-2008) (describing both corporate governance and social equality concerns). 
23 See, e.g. Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 877, 920 (2007) (examining provisions of the tax code enacted in 1993 in order to limit excessive 
compensation and concluding that these provisions have actually resulted in more costs to shareholders). 
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following section provides a brief overview of the issues, then moves to 
examine the compensation debate that has arisen specifically in the context 
of the bailout, and then proposes prospective clawback provisions as a 
potentially effective response to a long-standing conundrum. 
A.  Brief Overview of Executive Compensation 
Part of the concern with executive compensation is that the amount of 
payment involved is often contingent, difficult to value, or, at times, not 
fully transparent.  Many publicly traded companies provide a large portion 
of compensation in company stock or stock options, which have uncertain 
valuation.24  Other companies have a large portion of compensation 
awarded in year-end bonuses, while others utilize deferred compensation, 
i.e. pension obligations.  Still others reward executives with particular 
perks, such as use of the company jet, club memberships, or other fringe 
benefits. 
Yet another form of compensation that has proven to be controversial is 
the so-called “golden parachute,” a payment to the executive that is 
typically triggered in the event of a change of control in the corporation.25
The ostensible reason to adopt golden parachutes is to align the interest of 
the management with shareholders’ interests — otherwise incumbent 
management might resist an acquisition for the purpose of perpetuating 
their own tenure.26  However, in the vivid words of one commentator, 
golden parachutes conjure the “image of a laughing executive landing softly 
with oodles of misappropriated corporate assets while his corporation goes 
down in flames.”27  Looked at with skepticism as a payoff to existing 
management at the expense of shareholders, these payments have largely 
been regulated by unfavorable tax treatment in the Internal Revenue Code.28
1.  A Theory of Maximum Wages: Managerial Power 
In the introduction to this Article, we mentioned the influential work of 
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, who have extensively studied 
24 See, e.g. Seinfeld v. Bartz, 2002 WL 243597 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing valuation of stock options). 
25 See, e.g. Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
170, 171 (2004) (defining and providing mathematical example of golden parachute, arguing that golden 
parachutes increase value to shareholders); Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 955, (1987) (analyzing policy reasons for adopting such contractual provisions). 
26 See, e.g. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (struggles for corporate control create potential conflict of 
interest between shareholders and members of the board). 
27 Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 960 (1987). 
28 I.R.C. § 280G (West. Supp. 2009); I.R.C. § 4999 (2006).  See also Jamie Dietrich Hankinson, Golden 
Parachutes Fall Flat: Tax Gross-Ups Soften their Impact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their 
Coverage, 34 STETSON L. REV. 767, 770-71 (2005) (describing the tax penalties on excess parachute payments, 
and mentioning the possibility that costs for such tax penalties will merely be shifted back onto shareholders). 
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different forms of CEO pay and who have ultimately concluded that 
currently widely-used incentive based payments have failed to deliver on 
their promise of performance.29  Excessive pay packages in corporations 
with diffuse ownership have typically been seen as a classic agency 
problem30 — the difficulty a largely passive group of shareholders has in 
monitoring the actions of the firm’s managers.  Professors Bebchuk and 
Fried take the argument further, arguing that excessive compensation 
packages have their origin in the reluctance of directors to hold executives 
accountable for their performance, due to a structural bias among those who 
comprise boards of directors and management of corporations.31  Their 
critique speaks to deep structural flaws inherent in the separation of 
ownership and control in corporations.32
2. Legal Landscape 
The issue of executive compensation has mostly been addressed in the 
same way many other corporate governance issues have — through a 
fundamental federal dualism.33  The first layer of regulation consists of state 
law, operating through state corporations statutes, that constrain the board 
of directors through the doctrine of fiduciary duty, and at its outer limits, the 
doctrine of corporate waste.34 The second layer of regulation emerges 
through the federal laws governing the publicly held corporation, which 
focus on disclosure, transparency, and informed investor choice.35
Unfortunately, these dual approaches have not been particularly 
successful at curbing excessive compensation packages.36  Undoubtedly, 
one reason that might be so is that complete and accurate information on 
executive pay has not been publicly available, despite the ostensible 
29 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4; see also Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Equity Compensation for 
Long Term Results, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009 (advocating tying executive compensation to long-term rather 
than short-term metrics). 
30 See, e.g. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (REV. ED. 1968). 
31 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4; see also Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive 
Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2029-2030 (2007) (describing related idea of “groupthink” leading to 
suboptimal outcomes among decisionmakers in executive compensation context). 
32 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4. 
33 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (discussing differences in approaches between state and 
federal regulation of corporations). 
34 Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s Effect to Regulate Executive 
Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 481 (2007) (describing gaps left by the different approaches taken in 
federal and state regulation of executive compensation).  
35 Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 449, 450 (2002) (“primary policy of the federal securities laws involves the remediation of information 
asymmetries, that is, equalization of the information available to outside investors and insiders.”).  Securities law 
places a priority on disclosure because securities themselves do not have fixed or inherent value.  Id. 
36 See, e.g. Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 153, 154-6 (2009) 
(describing compensation consultants as contributing to the problem of excess executive compensation). 
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disclosure regime.37  While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not address 
executive compensation directly,38 the law did contain provisions that 
would allow the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to freeze assets 
for extraordinary payments, which could be applied to freeze executives’ 
golden parachutes in the instance of fraud.39  Public companies were no 
longer allowed to provide personal loans to management or other insiders 
— a form of “hidden” compensation.40  In certain circumstances, Section 
304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act empowered the SEC to bring an action to 
recover money from the executives to blame for a fraud.41  However, this 
provision (the so-called Sarbanes-Oxley clawback) has been largely 
ignored, with the agency bringing only two enforcement actions in the 
seven years since Sarbanes-Oxley has been in effect.42  As with any law, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is only as powerful as its implementation and 
enforcement. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms did not “fix” the 
broken components of executive compensation.43 The 2006 option 
backdating scandal demonstrated that many of the problems with executive 
compensation remained.44  Stock options are ostensibly incentive payments 
that are tied to a rise in the company’s stock price.  In the backdating 
scandal, however, companies retroactively adjusted the date of grant of the 
options to a date on which the stock price was comparatively low.45  With 
37 See, e.g. John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of SEC Executive 
Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194, 1194 (2007) (describing complex nature of disclosure 
rules and in addition, efforts to shirk the rules by disguising true value of compensation). 
38 For a general description and analysis of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Miriam A. Cherry, 
Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1055-69 (2004). 
39 SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Stephanie Francis Ward, SEC 
Can Freeze CEO Payouts, 4 No. 13 ABA J. E-REPORT  4, Apr. 1, 2005.   
40 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). 
41 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); see also Litigation Release No. 203887, SEC, 
Former United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $468 Million (Dec. 6, 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20387.htm; Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision 
of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (Nov. 
2008) (describing the fact that only the SEC can bring suit under § 304 and that there have only been two actions 
brought under this provision). 
42 Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley Turns Six: An Enforcement Perspective, 3 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 393, 408 (2008) (explaining that the SEC has brought only two enforcement actions under this 
provision).   
43 See, e.g. Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: Behind Soaring Executive Pay, Decades of Failed 
Restraints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1. 
44 For an in-depth discussion of the option backdating scandal, see, e.g. Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating 
and its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 857 (2008) (listing types of backdating and suggesting that 
such “secret” compensation arrangements reinforce inference of collusion between management and the board of 
directors).  See also Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 453 (2008) (suggesting pre-
arranged trading plans as a way to sidestep the problem of managerial exploitation of option grants; such pre-
arranged trading plans currently provide a safe harbor from the insider trading laws).  
45 See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option 
Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 564 (2007) (“Although option valuation is complex, at one level the backdating 
story is simple. Imagine that on March 15 the stock of Tech Inc. closes at $50/share. An option on Tech granted 
on that date would normally have an exercise price of $50/share. Granting the option “at the money” ensures that 
the recipient profits only if the shares appreciate in value and the shareholders profit. But imagine that the CEO of 
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the benefit of hindsight, the options were guaranteed to be “in the money.”46
Instead of incentive pay that would align the executives’ interest with that 
of the shareholders (and involved risk), backdated options became a “sure 
thing.”  As the adjustments were never disclosed to investors in periodic 
filings as they should have been, the SEC investigated over one hundred 
companies for engaging in the practice.47  In the aftermath of the backdating 
scandal, the SEC promulgated a series of regulations to govern disclosure of 
the value of executive pay.  Most notably, the SEC required that an accurate 
and extremely detailed valuation of the top executives’ compensation 
packages, including options and bonuses, be provided as part of the periodic 
filings required of publicly traded companies under the 1934 Securities and 
Exchange Act.48  In sum, the response to this particular executive 
compensation issue has been increased  federal government regulation.  Not 
all, however, would agree that that the issue of excessive executive 
compensation merits a similar response.  
3.  Counterarguments and Rebuttal 
Those who believe in less government intervention might reply that 
these compensation packages are the result of an efficient market.49  If 
corporations need to pay well in order to recruit the best talent, they should 
be allowed to do so, perhaps cabined in extreme circumstances by the state 
law doctrine of corporate waste.50  In certain circumstances, a high degree 
Tech looks back and notices that on February 15 the company's stock price was only $40/share. By falsifying the 
paperwork to make it appear that the company granted him an at-the-money option on February 15, when in fact 
the option was granted on March 15, the CEO has effectively acquired an option that is “in the money” by 
$10/share.”).
46 See Shipman, supra note 37 (describing option backdating and describing the reforms in adopted in 
response to the scandal, which the author characterizes as largely ineffectual). 
47 See Walker, supra note 45 at 562 (examining extent of the scandal). 
48 For a description of these rules, see generally Kenneth M. Rosen, “Who Killed Katie Couric?” and Other 
Tales from the World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2907 (2008) (providing 
exhaustive detail regarding administrative rulemaking around SEC disclosure rules for executive compensation 
and more generally arguing that scandal-driven reform is poor regulatory technique); Sean M. Donahue, Executive 
Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules Do Not Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, 61, n. 3 (2008); Leigh Johnson et al., Preparing Proxy Statements Under the 
SEC’s New Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 373 
(2007) (describing in detail proxy disclosure rules).  But see Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: 
Reining in Runaway Abuses — Again, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 153 (2006) (discussing how previous measures of 
curbing executive pay have been ineffective, and stating that “new disclosure rules seem like a good idea; 
however, in the past, attempts to legislate transparency have not been effective in curbing abuses in executive 
compensation.”).  
49 See, e.g. John E. Core, et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1173-79 (answering “no,” and arguing that executive compensation is aligned with 
performance through equity holdings and stock options); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: 
Executive Compensation When Agency Costs are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1618 (2007) (contending that 
compensation arrangements in bankruptcy result in similarly large pay packages, thus potentially disproving 
managerial power thesis). 
50 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“To recover on a claim of corporate 
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of skill could provide a huge benefit, whether that is in a competitive sport 
or in a business context.51  Additionally, one could argue that there is a 
market for executive services, and that it is appropriate to adopt the 
prevailing wage for a particular skill set.52
 In light of recent events, however, even Judge Richard Posner has, 
albeit reluctantly, come to the view that executive overcompensation is 
problematic.53  Instead of tying compensation to the success of the company 
it would appear in some circumstances executives sought to profit 
regardless of outcome, and that even in the wake of near insolvency the 
executives protected themselves through contractual provisions.  While 
“golden parachutes” for executives have long been part of the backdrop of 
corporate America,54 this burden has been borne by shareholders (who 
preserve the ability to exit), not the public at large.  However, as the 
taxpayers have come to realize, excessive pay practices were about to be 
foisted upon them through the mechanism of the financial bailouts. 
B.  Executive Compensation and “Clawbacks” in the Government Bailouts 
1.  Legal Landscape for Bonuses in the Bailout   
In the past months, much attention has focused on the payout of bonuses 
at companies accepting TARP funds, the proposed (still pending) tax on 
those bonuses, the later appointment of Kenneth Feinberg as Special Master 
(“Compensation Czar”), and the urging of the Obama Administration that 
Congress pass a non-binding shareholder “say on pay” law for all publicly 
waste, the plaintiffs must shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was ‘so one sided that no business 
person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.’ A 
claim of waste will arise only in the rare, ‘unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give away 
corporate assets.’  This onerous standard for waste is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment 
presumptions are applicable, the board's decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational 
business purpose.’) (internal footnotes omitted).  Although the standard that a plaintiff shareholder has to meet in 
allegations of corporate waste under Disney are extremely high, there is some hint that the doctrine of waste may 
be making a comeback in Delaware.  Specifically, the shareholder complaint in the Citibank case has moved 
forward in part on this basis.  In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative Litig., 964 A2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (allowing waste 
claim to survive motion to dismiss when “the Company paid the multi-million dollar compensation package to a 
departing CEO whose failures as CEO were allegedly responsible, in part, for billions of looses at Citigroup.”).  
51 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2005) 
(noting the market for various services including basketball players, and going on to argue that caution is called 
for in reforming executive compensation). 
52 For example, in Disney, Michael Ovitz was earning close to $20 million per year as the head of Creative 
Artists.  While his compensation package at Disney was enormous, that pay package did not look unreasonable if 
it was compared to his earnings and holdings in Creative Artists.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 
A2d at 37.  
53 Richard A. Posner, supra note 21, at 1014 (concluding reluctantly that the answer to the first question is 
“yes,” and listing quick responses to principal-agent problems inherent in corporate form). 
54 These practices still continue to date.  Although a recent study of proxy statements filed between October 
and December 2008 indicated that CEO pay fell for only the second time in two decades, there were still a number 
of publicly traded companies that provided lavish bonuses to their executives — despite no return on equity or 
deep losses.  See Phred Dvorak, Poor Year Doesn’t Stop CEO Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at B1. 
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held companies.55  The various Congressional mandates, Treasury 
Department interim rules, and executive pronouncements concerning 
executive compensation are complex, technical, and largely constitute 
compromise measures.56
Title VII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(“2009 Recovery Act”) is aimed at providing aid to large industries in order 
to curb the financial crisis.57  As part of its provisions, the 2009 Recovery 
Act specifically details limitations on executive compensation in companies 
that accept government bailout (TARP) funds.58  The Recovery Act states 
that the Secretary of the Treasury shall require each bailout recipient “to 
meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and corporate 
governance.”59  Critically, the statute requires a provision for the recovery 
of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation paid to a senior 
executive officer and any of the next 20 most highly-compensated 
employees based on financial results that are later found to be materially 
inaccurate.60  It also prohibits making any golden parachute payment to a 
senior executive officer or any of the next 5 most highly-compensated 
55 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and 
Corporate Governance (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/ tg165.htm.; Press 
Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 
2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg163.htm; see also Sarah Lynch, Tsy Explains Why Only 
7 Firms Must Answer to Compensation Czar, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009; Cari Tuna & Joann S. Lublin, New Pay 
Guidelines Raise Questions, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009; Louise Story & Eric Dash, U.S. to Propose Wider 
Oversight of Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at A1. 
56 Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2009, at 
A1.  Apparently, several economists within the Obama administration expressed the countervailing concern that 
too many restrictions of executive pay might prevent banks from deciding to accept the bailout funds, even if it 
meant that the credit crisis would continue.  Id. 
57 For an analysis of the financial crisis, its causes, and the subsequent bailouts in the law review literature, 
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (“[m]ost of the causes . . . can be attributed to conflict of interest, investor 
complacency, and overall complexity, all exacerbated by cupidity.”); Davidoff & Zaring, Big Deal: The 
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis (forthcoming 2009) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306342 (“[t]he government decided, in the course of less 
than a month, to create through congressional action an unprecedented $700 billion asset purchase program and 
then turned this authorization into a massive investment in the country’s largest financial institutions. It capstoned 
the investment by forcing the nation’s nine largest, remaining financial institutions to accept $125 billion of 
government equity — a partial nationalization which the United States had never seen before.”).  See also Henry 
M. Paulson, Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A27 (former 
Secretary of the Treasury describing a “financial crisis more severe and unpredictable than any in our lifetimes,” 
and recounting that by “September the government faced a systemwide crisis.  . . [by October] we needed to move 
quickly and take powerful steps to stabilize our financial system and to get credit flowing again.”).   
58 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, Title VII, § 7001.  
Title VII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 refers to executive compensation and 
specifically amends § 111 of the earlier recovery bill, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111, 
12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (West Supp. 2009).  For ease of reference, the following citations will track the changes 2009 
Recovery Act made to Section 111 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
59 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 111 (b)(2). 
60 § 111 (b)(3)(B) (requiring a “provision for the recovery . . . of any bonus, retention award, or incentive 
compensation paid to a senior executive officer and any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees . . . 
based on [financial results] ... that are later found to be materially inaccurate”). 
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employees so long as any obligation arising from financial assistance in the 
bailout remains outstanding.61  A separate subheading limits “luxury 
expenditures,”62 which may include “entertainment or events,” “office and 
facility renovations,” “aviation or other transportation services” or the 
catchall category of “other activities or events that are not reasonable 
expenditures.”63  Finally, the section ends by establishing a so-called “say 
on pay,” which requires disclosure of executive compensation and then a 
non-binding shareholder vote on the executive compensation package.64
The most conflicted and troubling portion of the 2009 Recovery Act, 
however, is that in listing the prohibitions on executive compensation, 
previous bonuses that were awarded are expressly exempted from any 
limitations.65  Specifically, the law states that the prohibition on awards of 
bonuses or restrictive stock “shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus 
payment required to be paid pursuant to a written employment contract 
executed on or before February 11, 2009, as such valid employment 
contracts are determined by the Secretary or the designee of the 
Secretary.”66
1. Retroactive Application of the Laws to AIG Bonuses 
A brief discussion of how these provisions relate to the AIG bonuses 
may be instructive.  As referenced in the introduction, the House of 
Representatives passed legislation to tax a number of the AIG bonuses at a 
90% rate, but that bill has not been passed by the Senate.67  The pending bill 
faced various legal obstacles — one of which, as explained in the previous 
section, was that Congress had seemingly acquiesced in these very same 
bonus payments only a month earlier in the 2009 bailout bill.68  It seems 
clear that the government had several opportunities to ensure that excessive 
bonuses were not paid, but unfortunately failed to act.69    Notwithstanding, 
61 § 111 (b)(3)(C) (mandating a “prohibition on  . . . making any golden parachute payment to a senior 
executive officer or any of the next 5 most highly-compensated employees  . . . during the period in which any  . . 
. obligation arising from financial assistance [in the bailout] remains outstanding”). 
62 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 111 (d). 
63 § 111 (d)(1)-(4) (defining luxury expenditures to possibly include “entertainment or events;  . . . office and 
facility renovations . . . aviation or other transportation services” or the catchall category of “other activities or 
events that are not reasonable expenditures”). 
64 § 111 (e)(1)-(2). 
65 § 111 (b)(3)(D)(iii). 
66 Id. 
67 See To Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received from Certain TARP Recipients, H.R. 1586, 111th
Cong. (2009) (passed House of Representatives, Mar. 19, 2009). 
68 2009 Recovery Act, § 111 (b)(3)(D)(iii).  An earlier version of the bill had much more serious restrictions 
— which gave the company a choice of having the bonuses be forfeited or charging the company a high tax rate.  
In providing the choice, Congress might have avoided the retroactivity problem.  Unfortunately those parts of the 
bill were eliminated, and now members of Congress are blaming each other for its erasure.  See Jonathan 
Weisman, The AIG Controversy: Dodd’s Amendment at Crux of Bonus Issue, WALL ST. J., March 19, 2009, at 
A4. 
69 See Solomon, supra note 2 (“Administration officials say they didn’t have enough time to deal with 
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it is curious that AIG seemed to rush to pay bonuses,70 when the board of 
directors might have had valid legal arguments that there were defenses to 
such payment.71  Nonpayment would have forced the executives to bring 
suit against AIG, at the very least providing the company with some delays, 
a respite from the scandal, and perhaps given Congress a chance to 
respond.72
There are further legal concerns with the pending bonus tax bill.  Its 
narrow focus on particular companies and executives may raise a concern 
about whether it constitutes an unlawful bill of attainder.73  All of these 
legal concerns about the bill (which without a doubt constitute factors in its 
lingering non-passage by the Senate) underscore how difficult it can be to 
attempt retroactive remedies in the bonus context.74  That is not to say that 
bonuses before AIG  . . . [paid them].  They say Mr. Geithner [the Treasury Secretary] learned of the payments on 
March 10 — just a few days after the Treasury loaned another $30 billion to AIG.”) 
70 Among the justifications for paying out the bonuses was AIG CEO Liddy’s fear that the company would 
be assessed legal penalties under Connecticut labor laws for withholding employee wages.  Letter from Edward 
M. Liddy, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Am. Int'l Group, Inc., to Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/5a06cc90-118d-11de-87b1-0000779fd2ac.pdf. However, 
the Attorney General of Connecticut expressed doubt about AIG’s interpretation.  As Connecticut Attorney 
General Blumenthal put it, “AIG was categorically wrong when it claimed that state labor law compelled 
payments of these outrageous, unconscionable bonuses . . . A provision in Connecticut law requiring double 
payment for failure to pay wages does not apply to AIG bonuses . . . [was] a joke of a justification to reward 
financial failure and fiasco.”  David Savage, Connecticut Attorney General Does the Math on AIG Bonuses, L.A.
TIMES, March 22, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-aig-more-bonuses22-
2009mar22,0,3609134.story.  
71 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Op-Ed., AIG’s Bonus Blackmail, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A23 
(listing a number of potential defenses to payment in op-ed piece; perhaps most convincing are the defenses based 
on changed circumstances or fraudulent conveyance law); see also Posting of Lawrence A. Cunningham to 
Concurring Opinions, AIG Contracts Questions, (Mar. 16, 2009, 14:42),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/aig_contract_qu.html (weblog posting on same subject 
material, covered in more depth).  In both of these analyses, Professor Cunningham was careful to stress that any 
opinion about the legality of the contracts would need to start with the organic documents themselves.  For the 
contracts themselves, see AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., 2008 Employee Retention Plan (effective Dec. 1, 2007), 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/employeeretentionplan.pdf; AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., 
Schedule 1 "Confirmation and Acknowledgement" to 2008 Employee Retention Plan (undated), 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/confirmation_and_acknowledgement.pdf. 
72 Cunningham, AIG’s Bonus Blackmail, supra note 71. 
73 While public outrage is in these instances is certainly understandable, some caution is indeed called for.  
The issue in these companies — unlike that in the Madoff hedge fund — is not fraud (the fraud that did occur was 
in the loan origination for certain subprime mortgages, but the financial derivatives that AIG traded were removed 
from such activity.  Rather the issues were separating the profits from loan origination from the risks of default, 
failing to anticipate changes in market conditions, faulty financial modeling, and failures to respond to red flags.  
It is possible that some bonus-recipients neglected their duties or unjustifiably took risks (or failed to take risks).  
While taxpayers are understandably angry and frustrated with the cost of these bailouts, the poor results were 
some combination of the product of mismanagement and/or poor judgment of risks and market conditions, not 
intentional fraud. 
74 With the benefit of hindsight, it seems easy to avoid these problems.  Before obtaining an 80% equity 
stake, the Department of the Treasury should have insisted that both AIG and its executives abrogate all but a 
small portion of the bonus contracts as a condition of the investment.  Without such a “rescue” the companies 
would fall into bankruptcy, which would have put the executives on equal footing with all of the company’s other 
creditors.  Cf. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, supra note 57  (describing government policy in the bailout as 
a series of transactional “deals,” and suggesting that the government exhibited classic dealmaking behavior — 
walking away from situations that were unfavorable).  Faced with a worthless claim for million in bonuses (or 
close to worthless, as they would receive little in the bankruptcy), the executives would likely agree to a reduced 
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arguments for recovery of these bonuses will be unsuccessful; but 
attempting to impose clawbacks retroactively through legislation is 
certainly not as efficient as including a clawback provision organically 
within the body of the initial contract. 
2. Bonuses at Merrill Lynch 
The original Fall 2008 recovery bill established that if the Department 
of the Treasury received a “meaningful equity or debt position in the 
financial institution” then the recipient of the aid had to “meet appropriate 
standards for executive compensation” so long as the government remained 
a stakeholder.75  However, in the wake of the first bailout bill in the Fall of 
2008,76 it came to light that many of the troubled companies had paid large 
bonuses to executives before their woes had arisen, others had actually 
moved up bonuses even after problems had started, and some companies 
were still contractually bound to provide golden parachutes to departing 
executives.  Estimates have varied wildly as to the amounts of the bonuses 
and the number of executives who received them.77
There have been allegations that in the wake of its poor performance 
and scheduled acquisition by Bank of America, Merrill Lynch actually 
moved up the schedule for payment of bonuses.78  At the time of this 
writing, the New York Attorney General is examining the bonus structure 
and the timing of payments at Merrill Lynch in order to determine whether 
the securities laws were violated in the days leading up to the merger.79
Filings by the Attorney General allege that these bonus payments were in 
bonus amount. 
75 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (West Supp. 2009). 
76 Id. 
77 As part of an article on excessive executive compensation, the New York Times commissioned a study that 
calculated that over $500 million in performance-based payments had been made to top executives of seven 
“troubled companies” since 2005.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2009, at B1.  The seven troubled companies that were part of the study were American International Group, Bear 
Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Washington Mutual.  For a full 
list of the companies receiving funds in the bailout, see note 1, supra.  However, the New York Times estimate 
seems suspect, in that it is very low compared to other numbers reported in the newspapers — the alleged AIG 
bonuses on their own being almost $200 million — and the filings from the New York Attorney General’s Office 
that estimated the amount paid out in bonuses ranging in the billions.  See note 80, infra.  See also Aaron 
Lucchetti & Peter Lattman, Wall Street Shudders as Lawmakers Take Aim a the Industry’s Pay System, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 20, 2009, at A6 (“Last year, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co., Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. and Bear Stearns Cos. Likely paid more than $20 billion in overall bonuses, even though 
they posted a combined net loss of nearly $26 billion.”). 
78 See, e.g. Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York and the Honorable 
Barney Frank, Chairman, House Financial Services Committee to Kenneth D. Lewis, Chairman, Chief Executive 
& President, Bank of America Corporation (Mar. 9, 2009) (on file with author) (alleging that “late last year [2008] 
Merrill Lynch moved up its planned date to allocate bonuses and then richly rewarded many of its executives.”). 
79 Dan Fitzpatrick, Merrill Pay Scrutinized, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A2; Susanne Craig, Merrill’s $10 
Million Men, Top 10 Earners Made $209 Million in 2008 as Firm Foundered, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, A1, at 
A11; Susanne Craig & Dan Fitzpatrick, Merrill Men Paid Over $10 Million Subpoenaed, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 
2009, at C1. 
14      [19-Aug-09 
 Cherry & Wong
the aggregate worth approximately $3.6 billion, and primarily went to 
enrich 700 of the top employees at Merrill Lynch.80  Adding proverbial 
insult to injury, Merrill’s then-CEO, John Thain, asked for an additional 
bonus at the end of what was a financially disastrous 2008 for the 
company.81  After deliberation, the board of directors decided not to pay 
Thain the requested bonus because of the potential public outrage it might 
have engendered.82  Although Thain apparently later withdrew his request 
in the wake of the board’s opposition, the incident prompted further 
attention from the Attorney General’s Office.83
3.  Analysis and Evaluation of Executive Compensation in the Bailout 
By this point, it should be apparent that the 2009 Recovery Act’s 
provisions regarding executive compensation are extremely problematic.  
Not only was the 2009 Recovery Act weak and ineffective in its provisions 
regarding limits on compensation, the law paradoxically strengthened the 
AIG executives’ claim to the bonuses by exempting them from regulation.84
The day after the 2009 Recovery Act was signed into law, “some critics 
identified weaknesses, suggesting the restrictions be retroactively applied to 
companies that already have received federal bailout cash [.]”85  Other 
criticisms included the idea that the companies might give executives new 
titles in order to dodge the restrictions, and that the grants of restricted stock 
did not need to be tied to performance.86  All of these weaknesses were 
brought into startling relief by the controversy surrounding the AIG 
bonuses.87 As discussed above, there were many ways that the Treasury 
80 Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, to the Honorable Barney 
Frank, Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services (Feb. 10, 2009) (on file with author). 
81 Susanne Craig, Heat Turns Up on Merrill Bonuses’ Timing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C1 (providing 
conflicting accounts regarding Thain’s request for a bonus); Louise Story, Bonus Season Afoot, Wall Street Tries 
for a Little Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at B1 (describing Thain’s request as being for $10 million). 
82 Story, supra note 81. 
83 Id. (reporting that Cuomo wrote a letter in which he severely criticized the idea of asking for additional 
performance bonuses to those at Merrill Lynch, calling such request “a thumb in the eye to taxpayers.”) 
84 Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at 
A1. 
85 Id. 
86 Id; see also Kate Kelly & David Enrich, Wall Street Pursues Pay Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, 
at C1. 
87 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 111 (b)(3)(D)(iii).  In the wake of public outrage 
regarding the bonuses, members of Congress are blaming each other for the poorly thought-out bonus exemption.  
See Weisman, supra note 5 (reporting that an earlier version of the bill “would have capped bonuses at $100,000, 
retroactive to 2008. Companies awarding bonuses above that level would face the choice of returning those funds 
to the Treasury or having them taxed at 35%.  Another, by Mr. Dodd, slapped sharp limits on all compensation of 
top employees, including bonuses.  Both amendments passed the Senate easily, but during House and Senate 
negotiations, the Wyden-Snowe amendment dropped out of the bill with little fanfare. Lawmakers and the 
administration raised constitutional objections, since it would have taxed 2008 income retroactively. Its authors 
argued that because companies were given a choice whether to return the bonuses or face a tax, the measure was 
not actually taxing past income but would "tax" a company's future decision —- made with full knowledge of the 
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Department could have dealt with the bonus issue, but instead the situation 
was mishandled.88
Although it is not the focus of this Article, we present some options for 
addressing the problem that has been created — in a way that will pass 
constitutional muster.  Public outrage, shaming, and pressure from elected 
officials (while not technically a legal remedy) are apparently having some 
effect on the AIG bonus recipients.89  Another avenue would be to revisit 
the provision that allows the Secretary of the Treasury the ability to 
determine whether the bonus payments were made pursuant to “valid 
employment contracts.”90  Between the strong public policy implications, 
the changed and unusual circumstances of an infusion of government 
money, the law of fraudulent conveyance, and the Attorney General of 
Connecticut’s statements that there was never the potential liability under 
the labor laws of that state, there could be a freeze on these executives’ 
assets until the Secretary of the Treasury (or the new Special Master / 
Compensation Czar designee) had an opportunity to review the bonuses for 
fairness.  State law might provide shareholders some redress in the form of 
an action for recovery under the corporate waste doctrine.91  Although 
typically an exacting legal standard, the magnitude of the losses and these 
lavish rewards might actually provide an important test case for resurrecting 
the waste doctrine.92  Finally, other agency or employment law principles, 
such as the faithless servant doctrine, might provide some redress for 
aggrieved shareholders.93
While there are these possibilities for recovery, retroactive legislative 
response or administrative rulemaking are difficult to fit within existing 
legal frameworks.  Subsequent bills targeting bonuses distributed by TARP 
recipients have been introduced, but have also languished in Congress.94
consequences.”).  It does seem unfortunate that this earlier provision was dropped from the bill. 
88 See Pleven, Ng & Reddy, supra note 5, at A16 (“A top Democratic lawmaker suggested that earlier, 
stricter limits should have been placed on AIG.  ‘Clearly there was a mistake at the beginning,’ said Rep. Barney 
Frank[.]”); see also Weisman, supra note 5. 
89 See, e.g. Jake De Santis, Op-Ed., Dear AIG, I Quit!, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 2009 at A25 (op-ed of 
executive in AIG’s Financial Products division who, while using strong rhetoric about the validity of the 
contracts, is donating the $750,000 bonus he received to charity and quitting his job).  See also Brady Dennis, 
Challenges Remain for AIG Employees, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2009 (noting that employees at AIG’s Financial 
Products Division have agreed to return more than $50 million). 
90 § 111 (b)(3)(D)(iii). 
91 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
92 Id. 
93 Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), § 469 (“An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct 
which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a willful and deliberate 
breach of his contract of service, he is not entitled to compensation even for properly performed services for 
which no compensation is apportioned.”); see, e.g. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth, 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2nd Cir. 
2003) (“Under New York law . . . One who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the 
performance of his services is generally disentitled to recover his compensation, whether commissions or salary.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  Although perhaps not as apt in the AIG situation, the faithless servant 
doctrine might have some application to Merrill Lynch, if the allegations that the dates and timing of particular 
bonuses are accurate, as that could implicate some difficult conflicts or duty of loyalty issues.  
94 To Amend the Executive Compensation Provisions of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
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The Obama Administration and the Treasury Department, under pressure to 
take action, have cobbled together a multi-pronged approach in the months 
following the attention focused on bonuses.  First, Kenneth Feinberg was 
named as a Special Master (termed in the media the “Compensation Czar”) 
with oversight responsibility for pay practices at the seven companies 
receiving the largest amounts of government assistance.  Second, the 
Treasury Department is now pressing for legislation and SEC rulemaking 
that would require a non-binding say-on-pay vote by shareholders at all 
public-traded companies.95
Perhaps these recent efforts will finally bring the problem of excessive 
executive compensation to a larger national audience that is empowered to 
seek change.   Nonetheless, the pending bonus tax highlights the problem of 
attempting a “retroactive clawback” through the avenue of legislation.  The 
question posed then is what, going forward, can we do to fix the problems 
identified in a constructive and prospective fashion?      
C.  Reverse Alchemy: Turning Gold Into Lead 
The credit crisis and subsequent bailouts have cast a long shadow of 
uncertainty over many aspects of the investment banking industry, 
insurance, mortgage, and other businesses.  However, in addition to 
ensuring that credit continues to be available, the bailouts might well 
provide an opportunity for meaningful reform of executive compensation.96
One way that this might be accomplished would be writing clawback 
provisions into executive compensation contracts prospectively.  The 
change would result in the routine and widespread use of clawback 
provisions in executive compensation contracts, and could (at some point) 
result in an SEC mandate for such provisions. 
1. Prospective Voluntary Clawback Provisions 
  There are some indications that prospective voluntary clawback 
provisions might be becoming more commonplace.  Over a year before the 
first bailout, computer giant Intel was already voluntarily implementing 
clawback provisions in the event that bonuses were paid out  in error, on the 
to Prohibit Unreasonable and Excessive Compensation and Compensation not Based on Performance Standards, 
H.R. Res. 1664, 111th Cong. (2009).  This legislation is waiting for Senate approval.
95 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
96 With a backward looking glance, some of the federal programs that helped end the Depression are 
instructive.  Stabilizing the economy is an important goal, but the New Deal remains best-known for its social and 
regulatory programs than merely for its Keynesian deficit spending to stimulate economic recovery.  Cf. William 
G. Ross, When Did the “Switch in Time” Actually Occur?: Re-Discovering the Supreme Court’s “Forgotten” 
Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153 (2005) (describing importance of New Deal legislation). 
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basis of accounting results that had to be restated.97  A recent study by a 
compensation-tracking firm, Equilar, noted that clawback provisions in 
executive contracts have started to gain more acceptance in the past two 
years.98  The study examined the SEC disclosures of the 95 companies 
within the Fortune 100 that are publicly traded.99  The study, however, 
defines “clawback provision” broadly, thus sweeping a large number of 
contracts, provisions, and policies under this umbrella term, even if they 
might not be particularly effective.100  The effectiveness of any contractual 
remedy, as discussed in Appendix A, infra, will depend on the language that 
the contract uses and how the clause is structured. 
The investment firm Morgan Stanley, which received billions in the 
bailout, is one firm that has instituted a “voluntary” clawback clause.  As an 
internal memorandum from Morgan Stanley’s CEO John Mack disclosed at 
the end of 2008, their analysis of year-end bonuses also attempted “to tie 
compensation more closely to multi-year performance and each employee’s 
contribution to [Morgan Stanley’s] profitability.”101  The memorandum 
goes on to state that the compensation packages will “include a new 
clawback provision which [Morgan Stanley] will implement as a permanent 
part of our compensation policy”: 
In 2008 and beyond, for all bonus-eligible employees, we 
are making part of the year-end bonus deferral a cash award 
subject to a clawback provision that could be triggered if 
the individual engages in conduct detrimental to the Firm.  
The clawback could be triggered if an individual, for 
example, caused the need for a restatement of results, a 
significant financial loss or other reputation harm to the 
Firm or one of its businesses. . . . Starting in 2009, we 
expect to institute a multi-year performance plan for senior 
executives, including the CEO, that will tie a portion of 
their compensation directly to the Firm’s performance over 
a three-year period — with one third of this compensation 
tied to the Firm’s return on equity (ROE), a second third 
tied to Morgan Stanley’s relative ROE versus our peers, 
and the final third tied to total shareholder return on a 
relative basis.102
97 See Gretchen Morgenson, Intel Can Recover Bonuses It Shouldn’t Have Paid, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/business/31chip.pay.html?ref=businessspecial. 
98 Equilar, Executive Compensation Trends, Nov. 2008 (on file with authors). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 John Mack Memorandum (on file with authors). 
102 Id. 
18      [19-Aug-09 
 Cherry & Wong
According to a New York Times story, while Morgan Stanley’s clawback is 
broader, it was actually modeled after an earlier November announcement 
by UBS.103
In voluntarily adopting and implementing clawback provisions, many 
companies are attempting to fix the compensation disconnect.104  The 
amount of actual reform, of course, will depend on the specifics of the 
clawback provision itself.105  Because these contracts are individually 
negotiated, there is room for variation.106  Some clawback provisions 
require that an employee be actually involved in a fraud in order to trigger 
the repayment requirement.107  Others merely require the amounts to have 
been paid in error based on incorrect accounting results.108
2. The Silver Lining of Prospective Reform 
One of the questions that would naturally arise would be why 
corporations would voluntarily choose to institute clawback provisions, or 
perhaps, the more insightful question would be why any leading executives 
would agree to them?109  If Bebchuk and Fried are correct in describing 
their managerial power thesis, and if previous efforts to constrain executive 
pay have been unsuccessful, why would clawback provisions be any 
different?  After all, executive compensation has either stayed at the same 
levels or increased, even in the face of tax regulations,110 mandated 
disclosure,111 and shareholder lawsuits.112
There is reason to think, however, that clawback provisions might prove 
more durable and effective than past efforts. Politically, this is an excellent 
time for reform.  Currently there is a high level of public outrage at 
executive pay — created in large part by the economic crisis, the bonuses, 
the large risks taken, and the liabilities created for the government.113
103 Louise Story, Bonus Season Afoot, Wall Street Tries for a Little Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at 
B1. 
104 See, e.g., David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 307 (2006) (describing best practices in 
both administrative agencies and business management as a “curiosity,” since the term is oft-used but ill-defined).    
105 See Appendix A, infra (categorizing various clawback provisions, culled from SEC disclosures, into 
those triggered by bad faith, fraud/misconduct, and restatement of financial results).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Morgenson, supra note 97. 
109 See Joann S. Lublin, More Directors Are Cutting Their Own Pay, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at B1 
(describing cost-cutting measures at several companies, including General Motors, Ford, Eddie Bauer and Herman 
Miller, and an effort by the directors to show leadership at the top to turn performance around). 
110 See supra Part I(A). 
111 Id.
112 Id.  As discussed above, however, the Disney opinion did little to constrain excessive executive 
compensation; in fact, if anything, the decision let the board off so easily that it almost countenanced such 
practices. 
113 See Phillips, supra note 5. 
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Companies therefore have the incentive, for public relations purposes if 
nothing else, to include contractual clawbacks in their employment 
contracts.   
Additionally, the political impetus may yet result in government 
regulation mandating such clawbacks.  At the moment, these contractual 
clawbacks are voluntary provisions and constitute “best practices.”114
However, some language from the Treasury Department in a recent press 
release raises the possibility that what we might now consider the early 
emergence of a “best practice” may become a part of future federal 
regulation.115  In a recent release the Department of the Treasury stated: 
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission should work together to 
require compensation committees of all public financial 
institutions — not just those receiving government assistance
— to review and disclose executive and certain employee 
compensation arrangements and explain how these 
compensation arrangements are consistent with promoting 
sound risk management and long-term value creation for their 
companies and their shareholders.  . . . Over the last decade 
there has been an emerging consensus that top executives 
should receive compensation that encourages more of a long-
term perspective on creating economic value for their 
shareholders and the company at large.  One idea worthy of 
serious consideration is requiring top executives at financial 
institutions to hold stock for several years after it is awarded 
before it can be cashed-out as this would encourage a more 
long-term focus on the economic interests of the firm.116
Similar intimations were made in a recent speech by an SEC official, who 
suggested that companies not involved in the bailout might, nonetheless, 
wish to follow these limitations for guidance on best practices.117  While 
currently voluntary, these provisions could be mandated in the future.118
We believe that the demands for change engendered by the financial 
114 Zaring, Best Practices, note 104, supra. 
115 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive 
Compensation, TG-15 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm. 
116 Id. (emphasis added by authors). 
117 John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corporate Fin., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Executive Compensation 
Disclosure: Observations on Year Two and a Look Forward to the Changing Landscape for 2009 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch102108jww.htm. 
118 See Richard R. Floersch, The Right Way to Determine Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at A15 
(“In this climate [the financial crisis], those responsible for setting the parameters in the private sector need to 
start asking the right questions and taking actions, even if the results aren’t popular among executives.  If they 
don’t, Congress will likely seek to change the way compensation is provided.”). 
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crisis can provide a “silver lining” — a genuine opportunity for meaningful 
change in the executive compensation arena.  One of the major problems 
with executive compensation has been a focus only upon short-term 
performance.  Such short-term thinking often leads to opportunistic 
behavior, at the expense of the long-term health of the company.  By in a 
sense operating as a “lead parachute,” prospective clawback provisions 
begin to align incentives over a longer timeframe. 
II. CLAWBACKS IN PONZI SCHEMES
The Madoff hedge fund fraud has grabbed headlines the world over, and 
with good reason.  Apart from its soap-opera-like aspects,119 both the sheer 
scope of the fraud and the fact that ostensibly sophisticated investors across 
the globe from Abu Dhabi to Zurich were duped by a sprawling Ponzi 
scheme have gained the story a widespread and deserved notoriety.120
Bernard L. Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ Stock Market 
and a well-respected figure on Wall Street before his dramatic arrest in 
2008,121 first began to lure investors into his scheme in the early 1990s.122
He attracted not only institutional clients like hedge funds, pension funds 
and charitable organizations,123 but also prominent wealthy individuals like 
Steven Spielberg, billionaire art collector Norman Braman, New York Mets 
owner Fred Wilpon, and actor Kevin Bacon.124  While his clients were told 
their investments were turning handsome profits in a hedge fund, Madoff 
had not been purchasing any securities in the decade leading to his arrest, 
never mind creating a hedge fund.125  To keep up appearances, Madoff 
claimed to employ a “split-strike conversion strategy,” investing in a basket 
of stocks that would closely mimic the price movements of the Standard & 
Poor's 100 index, rotating out of the market into government-issued 
119 Bernard Madoff confessed the fraud to his two sons, telling them he believed that the losses from the 
fraud exceeded $50 billion and that he would turn himself in but not before distributing some $200 to $300 
million currently in the fund’s accounts to certain employees of the firm.  In response, the two sons turned him in 
to the authorities.  See Amir Efrati et al., Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at 
A1. In addition, Rene-Thierry Magon de la Villehuchetone, a prominent investor who traced his lineage to French 
aristocracy and had more than $1 billion of his client’s money entrusted with Madoff, committed suicide when the 
extent of the loss came to light.   See Associated Press, Suicide Madoff Investor Was 'Honorable Man,’ (Dec. 24, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28368421/.  
120 See Diana Henriques, Madoff Fraud Rippled Around the World, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 21, 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/21/business/madoff.php. 
121 See Amir Efrati, et al., supra note 119. 
122 See Mark Hamblett, Madoff Pleads and Is Led Off To Jail, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 13, 2009, at 1 (summarizing 
Madoff’s guilty plea).  
123 See id. 
124 See Keren Blankfeld Schultz & Duncan Greenberg, Bernie Madoff's Billionaire Victims, FORBES, Mar. 
12, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/12/madoff-guilty-plea-business-wall-street-celebrity-victims.html.  No 
doubt Kevin Bacon wishes there were somewhat more than six degrees of separation between him and Madoff. 
125 See Hamblett, supra note 122. 
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securities like treasury bills and hedging the investments by buying and 
selling option contracts related to those stocks.126 Madoff would further 
provide to clients false trading confirmations and account statements 
reflecting bogus transactions in support of this mythical “split-strike 
conversion strategy.”127  All the while, Madoff was simply paying off the 
early investors with funds generated from the later investors. 
Although there were skeptics who have insisted for years that Madoff 
could not have been investing his money legitimately, most accepted and 
believed that Madoff was a skilled investor with a proprietary investing 
platform that virtually could not lose.128  Indeed, when Madoff was reported 
to the SEC, the agency failed to conduct a thorough investigation in part 
because of his sterling reputation on Wall Street.129  In retrospect, with 
more complete information on Madoff’s investments, the alleged returns 
now appear to be virtually — and in some cases, physically — impossible 
to achieve.  Madoff told investors that he returned an average of 15.7% per 
year going back to January 1996.130  Between January 1996 and November 
2004, a loss was reported only for three months, and most months reflected 
between 1% and 1.5% returns.131 Moreover, Madoff claimed to be 
executing more option trades then the entire market had on many days.132
Unwieldly as it was, the “hedge fund” kept growing until 2008.  At that 
point, presumably because of the downturn in the economy, it became 
impossible for Madoff to recruit enough new money to keep it afloat.133
While Madoff allegedly confessed to running a $50 billion scheme, 
investigators are still uncertain about how much money was actually lost.134
Notwithstanding, the shortfall is staggering given that authorities have 
located only about $1 billion in assets belong to Madoff, including such 
eclectic items as a $39,000 piano and a $2.2 million boat tragically named 
“Bull.”135  Madoff has since pleaded guilty in federal court to 11 felony 
counts, including securities fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, 
perjury and false filings with the SEC,136 and on June 29, 2009, he was 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Gregory Zuckerman, Chasing Bernard Madoff, WALL ST. J., Dec 18, 2008, at A1. 
129 See id.
130 See Efrati et al., supra note 119. 
131 See id. 
132 See Lauricella et al., Firm Ran Vast Options Game; Charities Are Hit Hard, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, 
at A19. 
133 See id. 
134See Associated Press, Madoff Pleads Guilty to All 11 Charges, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hnkPe640MG8WMCAvAwv5GqtqxsOAD96SHG7O0 
(last visited March 14, 2009).   
135 Madoffs Were Worth More than $823m, Documents Show, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 13, 2009, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/03/13/business/NA-US-Madoff-Scandal-Assets.php. 
136 See  Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, Bernard L. Madoff Pleads 
Guilty To Eleven-Count Criminal Information And Is Remanded Into Custody, Mar. 12, 2009 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March09/madoffbernardpleapr.pdf 
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sentenced to 150 years in prison.137
Quite apart from its more sensational aspects, however, the fraud raises 
a series of complex and intriguing remedial questions:  What remedies, if 
any, are available to investors that have lost some or all of their investment 
(“losing investors”) as against those investors who have profited from the 
scheme (“winning investors”)?138  Do these remedies sufficiently protect 
such later investors and do or should they have the effect of deterring the 
fraud in the first place?  If not, should we look to private ordering to solve 
this problem before turning to regulation? 
These remedial questions arise because while the losing investors can 
turn to the courts to hold the operator of the fraud accountable, they are 
often forced to look elsewhere because the scheme and the operator are 
insolvent. The Madoff fraud serves as a prime example.  While the 
investors will already be in line with other creditors in the Madoff 
bankruptcy proceedings, the value of his assets is substantially less than the 
loss incurred by the investors.139
In a Ponzi scheme, losing investors would therefore look, naturally 
enough, to other solvent investors who have profited from the scheme, 
whether witting or not.140  If the winning investor was aware of the fraud, 
that investor could be required to disgorge all payments received, which are 
avoidable as fraudulent transfers.141  Because many, if not most of the 
investors, are innocent of the fraud,142 the more useful but difficult question 
— and therefore subject of this Part of the Article — is whether any 
remedies lie as against innocent winning investors. 
A short introduction to Ponzi schemes in general is in order here.  
Named after Charles Ponzi, the operator of the fraudulent scheme in 
137 See Chad Bray & Amir Efrati, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years in Multibillion-Dollar Ponzi Scheme, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124604151653862301.html (last visited June 29, 2009). 
138 While it is the case in many Ponzi schemes that the investors who profit are the early, initial investors, 
and the investors who lose some part of their investment are the ones who enter the fray later, this is of course not 
necessarily the case.  Whether an investor ends up as a losing or winning investor will depend on the 
circumstances and structure of the particular scheme and choices made by the particular investor. 
139 See Associated Press, supra note 134.
140 For example, in the Madoff fraud, the trustee as of May 15, 2009, had already sued to recover $10.1 
billion from six investors who withdrew substantial amounts from their Madoff accounts in the final years of the 
scheme.  See Diana B. Henriques, Trustee Sends $30 Million to Victims of Madoff Fraud, N. Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2009, B3. 
141 See In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 596 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (“In recognizing these claims for 
rescission and restitution, we assume that the investors had no knowledge of the fraud the debtors were 
perpetrating. If investments were made with culpable knowledge, all subsequent payments made to such investors 
within one year of the debtors' bankruptcy would be avoidable [as fraudulent transfers], regardless of the amount 
invested . . . .”).   
142 See, e.g., Eduardo J. Glas, Redemption Payments Salvaged Prior To The Collapse Of Ponzi Schemes:  
Investors, Beware!, BANKR. STRATEGIST, July 2007, at 3 (noting that the company, Bayou Superfund LLC 
“operated as a hedge fund which turned out to be a massive Ponzi scheme that snared a large number of innocent 
investors”).
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Cunningham v. Brown,143 a Ponzi scheme is an enterprise that makes 
payments to investors with monies received from newly-attracted investors, 
rather than from profits of a legitimate business venture.  Typically, 
investors are promised large returns on their investments, and initial 
investors are paid sizeable returns.  The money from new investors is then 
used to repay the earlier investors in order to keep the scheme afloat.  
Throughout this exercise, the promoter or Ponzi scheme operator draws off 
money from the enterprise, creating a loss.  Ultimately, as the enterprise 
gets further and further into debt, the scheme collapses, leaving many but 
not all investors without their principal investments or the promised 
profits.144  This phenomenon, as described above, is precisely what 
happened in the Madoff fraud.145  The question that presents itself is 
whether the losing investors may proceed against the winning investors in 
the course of the bankruptcy proceedings that often follow.146
As the discussion below will show, to the extent fraudulent transfer laws 
apply, any payments made to an innocent winning investor that is in excess 
— and only in excess — of the amounts of principal that she originally 
invested may be recoverable as fraudulent transfers.  While this provides 
some protection for the losing investor, it is a less-than-optimal solution as 
this will still leave the winning investors in a better position vis-à-vis the 
losing investors, even though both groups may be equally innocent and pure 
circumstance alone determines which group any investor falls into.  Further, 
such disparate outcomes may provide a disincentive to an investor to 
disclose any post-investment discovery of such fraud at least until that 
investor’s principal is recouped.  The introduction of clawback provisions in 
such investment contracts will not only potentially allocate the loss and 
therefore risk more evenly, it will counter the disincentive to so disclose.   
Significantly, because investors cannot in general determine beforehand 
whether they will be winning or losing investors, investors as a group will 
have the incentive to rely on and thus include clawback provisions in their 
investment contracts. 
143 265 U.S. 1 (1924). 
144 See In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 272 B.R. 233, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). 
145 See supra notes 120-137 and accompanying text. 
146 See Hon. Nancy C. Dreher, BANKR. SERVICE CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT, Sept. 2008, at 7 (“A 
common epilogue to a collapsed Ponzi scheme is a bankruptcy proceeding, and federal bankruptcy law expressly 
permits actions under the UFTA”).  While the investor may additionally turn to the Congress-created Securities 
Investment Protection Corporation  (SIPC), an institution that insures investor accounts in the event a brokerage 
firm fails owing customers cash and securities missing from those accounts, see
http://www.sipc.org/who/sipctrackrecord.cfm  (last accessed June 30, 2009), SIPC only insures up to $500,000 
per account and the scale of the Madoff fraud coming after the failure of Lehman has led the CEO of SIPC to 
question whether “SIPC’s resources will be adequate” to cover current losses. See Mary Pilon, Is the SIPC Sick?, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/01/30/is-the-sipc-sick/.  As of May 15, 2009, 125 
claims have been approved for payment that add up to losses of $368 million.  Almost all of the checks that have 
been mailed were for $500,000.  See Henriques, supra note 140.   
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A.  Recovery Under Fraudulent Transfer Laws 
To recover fraudulent transfers made by a debtor, a trustee may bring a 
claim under either Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or Section 544(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which incorporates state fraudulent transfer laws.147
In most states, such laws are derived from either the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (“UFTA”) or the older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(“UFCA”).148  There are but a few substantive differences between the two 
uniform statutes, or between the two statutes and Section 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.149  A major distinction among the provisions is the 
applicable reachback period:  While Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code 
allows avoidance of only those transfers made within two years of the 
petition date,150 the reachback period for fraudulent transfer claims under 
most states’ laws (which are based on either the UFTA or UFCA) is four 
years.151  In general, however, the basic principles governing fraudulent 
transfer actions are the same, regardless of the statutory basis used.152
As a typical example, the UFTA provides in relevant part that:  
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or 
147 This description of the fraudulent transfer laws in the context of Ponzi schemes is based in part on Mark 
McDermott’s excellent and concise treatment of the subject. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law 
of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998) (McDermott does not, however, 
examine clawbacks in the process).  Additionally, the trustee may be able to recover certain payments to the 
investors as a preference.  See generally id. at 181-188.  However, because preferential transfer law under the 
Bankruptcy Code applies only to transfers made within the ninety-day period prior to the filing of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case, see 11 U.S.C. § 547, its reach will in general be more limited than that of fraudulent transfer 
laws.  Cf. McDermott at 181 (noting the potential advantage of a preference action in allowing the trustee to 
recover the return of an investor’s principal, even though the investor made the investment in both subjective and 
objective good faith). 
148 See David F. Kurwaza II, Note, When Fair Consideration Is Not Fair, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
461, 465 (2002). 
149 See McDermott, supra note 147 at 159. 
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
151 See Lisa A. Dunsky, In re Bayou Group, LLC: The “Hotel California” Effect In Bankruptcies Of 
Fraudulent Hedge Funds, 28 No. 2 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 13, Part II (Feb., 2008) (noting that 
although it varies from state to state, the reachback period for fraudulent transfer claims under most states' laws is 
four years); David R. Weinstein et al., Reachbacks, Statutes of Limitation and Deadlines: Demystifying the 
Avoiding Powers, 26-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 n.12 (June 2007) (noting that the “pertinent provisions of the 
UFTA, usually § 9 [which describes a period of four years], are most often the source of the ‘look back’ period”).  
The reachback period provided under state law determines how far back in time before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition the trustee or debtor can “look” to find fraudulent transfers upon which to bring a section 
544(b) action.  This is distinct from the statute of limitations for such actions, which is governed by section 546(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.  See Dunsky at n. 10. 
152 See In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc., 174 B.R. 557, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994); In re
Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 483 n. 3 (D. Conn. 2002) (“[T]he basic principles governing fraudulent 
transfer actions are the same, regardless of the statutory basis used.”); In re Canyon Sys. Corp., 343 B.R. 615, 634 
n.15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (“The fraudulent transfer provisions of the Code and the UFTA are substantially 
similar.”) (citations omitted). 
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incurred the obligation: 
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction 
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed 
that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as 
they became due.153
Courts have applied fraudulent conveyance laws to allow receivers or 
trustees in bankruptcy to recover money from winning investors in a Ponzi 
scheme.154  Specifically, there are two theories of recovery that a trustee 
may rely upon under the fraudulent conveyance laws in these 
circumstances:  actual fraud and constructive fraud.155  However, under 
either theory, a trustee’s recovery as against the innocent winning investor 
will generally be limited to recovering the profits earned by the winning 
investor, and will not extend to any amount representing a return of the 
investor’s principal.156
In recovering under either theory, the trustee must prove that the debtor 
(i.e., Ponzi scheme operator) had “an interest” in the property transferred.157
There is no dispute in many fraudulent transfer actions arising in the context 
of bankruptcies involving Ponzi schemes that funds received involve 
property in which the debtor has an interest.158  To the extent that 
proposition has been disputed, courts have generally rejected such 
challenges, and have held that debtors under these circumstances have an 
interest in funds transferred to the investors.159
153 UFTA § 4(a). 
154 See, e.g., In re Agric. Research & Tech. Group, 916 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1990); Scholes v. Lehmann, 
56 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995).  
155 See McDermott, supra note 147 at 159. 
156 See id. 
157 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1); 544(b)(1).  See McDermott, supra note 147, at 160. 
158 See McDermott, supra note 147, at 161. 
159 See, e.g., In re Canyon Sys. Corp., 343 B.R. 615, 635 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2006) (“Payments made to 
investors in a Ponzi scheme constitute ‘transfers’ within the meaning of both § 101(54) of the Code and § 
1336.01(L) of the Ohio UFTA.  Further, a Ponzi scheme operator possesses a property interest in the transferred 
funds.”) (citations omitted); In re Ramirez Rodriguez, 209 B.R. at 432 ("Funds obtained from investors in a Ponzi 
scheme are property of debtor, and are thus susceptible to preferential and fraudulent disposition by debtor.");
Jobin v. Lalan (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 160 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993) (“There is no argument 
but that the investors gave their money to the Debtor voluntarily. Thus, at the time of each investment, the Debtor 
had at least the legal right to possession. It is elemental property law that one of the ‘interests in property’ 
included in the total bundle of property rights is the right of possession. All that § 548 requires is the transfer of an 
“interest” by the Debtor.  True, that interest was subject to defeat by each investor, but it nevertheless was an 
‘interest of the debtor in property.’”); In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 854 ("[W]hen a debtor obtains 
money by fraud and mingles it with other money so as to preclude any tracing and when the defrauded party ... 
accepts benefits under his contract with the debtor, the money is 'property' of the debtor within the meaning of 
section[ ] ... 548 of the Code.").
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To recover under the actual fraud theory, the trustee must further prove 
that the debtor made transfers to the winning investor "with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud" the losing investors,160 a burden readily met under 
these circumstances given that courts have held that "[t]he mere existence of 
a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish [such] actual intent."161  Although 
proving actual fraud would ordinarily allow the trustee to recover all 
transfers made to a winning investor, including amounts which could be 
considered return of principal, there is a good faith defense that permits an 
innocent winning investor to retain funds up to the amount of the 
principal.162
To recover under the constructive fraud theory, the trustee must 
additionally show that the transfer was made: (1) with the debtor receiving 
“less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer”; and 
(2) under circumstances involving one of three insufficient funds situations 
(including the situation where the debtor was insolvent at the time of 
transfer) or else to an insider under an employment contract and outside the 
ordinary course of business.163
Courts in general hold that a debtor does not receive a reasonably 
equivalent value for any payments made to the winning investor that 
represent profits since such profits are regarded as having been gained 
through theft from losing investors.164  Where the winning investor receives 
more than was invested, such “payments in excess of amounts invested are 
160 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
161 In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008).  Cf. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 548.04[1] at 
548-26 (15th ed. rev.2006) (noting that the plaintiff meets the requirement on demonstrating that the transferor 
“acted under circumstances that preclude any reasonable conclusion other than that the purpose of the transfer was 
fraudulent as to creditors”) (citing Lesser v. Jewel Factors Corp., 470 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir.1972)). 
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (“[A] transferee or obligee of . . . a [fraudulent] transfer or obligation that takes 
for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation 
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation.”) (emphasis added).  See also Scholes, 56 F.3d at 759.  See generally McDermott, 
supra note 147, at 175-181. 
163 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B), which provides as follows: 
(a)(1)The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider under an 
employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to 
or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily: 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and  
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became 
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;  
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which 
any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;  
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's 
ability to pay as such debts matured; or  
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of 
an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business. 
See also McDermott, supra note 147, at 164-173. 
164 Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757.  See also Dreher, supra note 146. 
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considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a return on 
legitimate investment activity.”165  In contrast, courts generally hold that a 
debtor does receive value for the return of an investor’s principal 
investments.166  The rationale here is that the investor has a claim for 
restitution against the debtor for the investor’s principal investment with the 
debtor by virtue of the debtor’s fraud,167 which claim constitutes a debt 
owed by the debtor to the investor.168
Additionally, proving the existence of one of the three insufficient funds 
situations is a typically straightforward matter for the trustee since various 
courts have held that a debtor operating a Ponzi scheme is deemed insolvent 
from its inception as a matter of law.169
As a result, federal courts generally determine whether the investor is 
liable by applying the so-called "netting rule."170  Under this rule, amounts 
transferred by the Ponzi scheme perpetrator to the investor are netted 
against the initial amounts invested by that individual.171  If the net is 
positive, the receiver has established liability, and the court then determines 
the actual amount of liability, which may or may not be equal to the net 
gain, depending on factors such as whether transfers were made within the 
relevant reachback period or whether the investor lacked good faith.172  If 
the net is negative, the good faith (innocent) investor is not liable because as 
described above, payments received in amounts less than the principal 
investment are not avoidable under fraudulent transfer laws.173
Thus, the general rule regarding recovery as against innocent winning  
investors in Ponzi schemes is that only payments made to them in excess of 
the amounts of principal originally invested are avoidable as fraudulent 
transfers.  The remaining assets in the scheme, as well as the fraudulent 
transfers recovered, are then ratably distributed among all of the creditors, 
165 In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 1991). 
166 See McDermott, supra note 147, at 165.  
167 See, e.g., United Energy, 944 F.2d 589; Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980). 
168 Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to 
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured .... 
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006). Section 101(12) defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” Id. § 101(12). 
169 See, e.g., Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir.2006) (observing that a Ponzi scheme “is, as a 
matter of law, insolvent from its inception”)(citation omitted); In re Evergreen Security, Ltd., 319 B.R. 245, 253 
(M.D.Fla.2003) (“Insolvency of the debtor as required by § 548(a)(1)(B) is established, when the Debtor is 
operating a Ponzi scheme.”); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. at 8, 44 S.Ct. at 425 (Ponzi scheme debtor was 
always insolvent and became more so each day business continued); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D.Ohio 
1972) (possible to establish that Ponzi scheme was insolvent from its very inception). 
170 See McDermott, supra note 147, at 168-9. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See supra Part II(a). 
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both losing investors and other noninvestor creditors of the estate.174
Broadly speaking, the rationale for this approach is that "winners" in the 
Ponzi scheme, even if innocent of any fraud themselves, are not in an 
equitably stronger position vis-à-vis the losing investors, and should not be 
permitted to benefit at the expense of the losing investor.  As one court 
framed the issue: 
The money used for the [underlying investments] came from investors 
gulled by fraudulent representations.  [The defendant] was one of those 
investors, and it may seem "only fair" that he should be entitled to the profits 
on trades made with his money.  That would be true as between him and [the 
Ponzi scheme operator].  It is not true as between him and either the creditors 
of or the other investors in the corporations.  He should not be permitted to 
benefit from a fraud at their expense merely because he was not himself to 
blame for the fraud.  All he is being asked to do is to return the net profits of 
his investment — the difference between what he put in at the beginning and 
what he had at the end.175
This observation would, technically, hold true for the Madoff fraud as 
well.  To the extent the investors in the Madoff fraud are equally 
blameless, courts could hold that the investor who pulls out early to cash 
in on the profit is on par, equitably speaking, with the investor who 
leaves funds in and therefore loses his investment, and treat the former’s 
profits as fraudulent transfers. 
B.  The Resulting Inequity Between Winning and Losing Investors 
The remedies currently provided under the law are less than satisfactory 
since it will be a matter of chance whether a particular innocent investor is a 
winning rather than a losing investor, and thus whether or not she will walk 
away from the scheme with her principal intact.  In other words, even 
though both the winning and the losing investor are equally blameless, the 
latter will suffer the greater loss in relative terms quite simply because that 
investor was “not so lucky."176  As noted above, it is precisely this 
unfairness that justifies the treatment of any payments made to the winning 
investors representing profit that is avoidable as fraudulent transfers and 
requiring their disgorgement for the benefit of the losing investors.177
While ameliorating the situation to some degree, fraudulent conveyance 
174 See McDermott, supra note 147, at 158. 
175 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1995). 
176 In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d at 596. 
177 See supra note 174-175 and accompanying text. 
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laws are highly unlikely to bring both sets of investors to parity.178  This 
disparity is further compounded by the fact that while payments of fictitious 
profit are potentially avoidable as fraudulent conveyances, the relevant 
reachback period may further restrict the payments the Ponzi scheme 
investor is required to repay.  Only transfers made within the reachback 
period are avoidable as such.179  In the case of an extensive fraud like that 
perpetuated by Madoff, the Ponzi scheme can extend over a decade.  Those 
initial and innocent winning investors who withdrew their money, say, ten 
years ago, would effectively be removed from the equation.   
For these reasons, courts have long held that it is more equitable to 
attempt to distribute all recoverable assets among the defrauded investors 
who did not recover their initial investments rather than to allow the losses 
to rest where they fall.180  Indeed, because the typical losing investor 
nonetheless remains at an unfair disadvantage,181 courts have sought to 
rectify the balance in other ways. 
For example, courts have begun to adopt a narrower reading of the good 
faith defense so as to potentially reach all payments received by an investor 
from the scheme, and not just the amounts representing the fictitious profits.  
In In re Bayou Group, LLC, a recent case also involving a massive hedge 
fund fraud, the Ponzi scheme persisted for years as a result of 
management’s falsification of its financial disclosures and fraudulent 
misrepresentation of its investment performances.182  This was facilitated in 
part by management’s termination of its independent auditor and the 
creation of a fictitious accounting firm to pose as the independent auditor.183
The court ruled there that under the actual fraud recovery theory,184 winning 
investors had to hand back their principal as well as their profits, even 
though they were not responsible for the fraud, if there was evidence that 
they redeemed their investments because there was a “red flag” that “put[] 
the investor on notice of some potential infirmity in the investment such 
that a reasonable investor would recognize the need to conduct some 
investigation” but who failed to do so.185  In the Bayou case, for example, 
178 See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (“According to the Receiver, in this case 
approximately 6,000 investors participated in the Wallenbrock Ponzi scheme, but only about 800 received back 
more than their initial investment. It is likely that many of the other 5,200 losing investors will see only a portion 
of their initial investment returned.”).  See also McDermott, supra note 149, at 157-159 (explaining that assets 
recovered after a collapsed Ponzi scheme typically are insufficient to satisfy claims by losing investors). 
179 See Warfield v. Alaniz, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (D. Ariz. 2006) (holding that a court appointed 
receiver could not base his claims under Arizona's UFTA on transfers that took place outside of the relevant time 
period); Neilson v. Union Bank of California, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that 
plaintiffs could prevail if they could prove at trial that certain transfers made pursuant to a Ponzi scheme were 
made within the relevant time period of California's UFTA).  See also supra notes 157-8, and accompanying text. 
180 See Donell, 533 F.3d at 776. 
181 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.  
182 See In re Bayou Group, L.L.C., 396 B.R. 810, 822 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
183 See id.
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 848.  More specifically, the court held that “a defendant may establish his [good faith] defense 
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one “red flag” might be the lack of an independent auditor if diligent 
investigation would have revealed the same.186  Already, some 
commentators have highlighted the possibility of the ruling in Bayou
applying in any litigation of the Madoff fraud.187
Notwithstanding the broad reading of applicable fraudulent conveyance 
laws, however, the law as it stands cannot in most cases return both sets of 
investors to parity.  It cannot, in other words, require every innocent 
investor to surrender as fraudulent transfers any and all payments received 
by the investor from the scheme, for equitable redistribution among all 
innocent investors on a pro-rata basis in accordance with the principal 
amount invested respectively.  Such a result is, however, potentially 
achievable with the use of contractual clawbacks in the underlying 
investment contracts. 
C.  Contractual Clawbacks in Ponzi Schemes 
In examining contractual clawbacks in the context of investment 
agreements, this section will consider in turn the function of clawbacks, 
their structure, and their desirability from both the perspective of the 
investor and public policy.  
1. The Function of Contractual Clawbacks 
Contractual clawbacks in investment agreements provide a way of 
minimizing the risk that any individual investor will be left in the position 
of a losing investor in the event the investment turns out to be part of a 
Ponzi scheme.  Instead of depending on courts to claw back payments made 
to winning investors at the back end — a remedy whose reach, as discussed 
above, is in general limited to a payment amount representing the 
(fictitious) profits — the investor could in theory better protect herself 
prospectively by including a provision in the investment contract that would 
claw back all amounts paid out to investors contingent on the fund 
becoming insolvent as a result of fraud.  The provision would also establish 
that the amounts so recovered would then be distributed to all investors on a 
pro-rata basis. 
[to a fraudulent conveyance claim] if he can prove by a preponderance of the credible objective evidence that his 
request for redemption was in fact the result of a good faith reason other than his knowledge of ‘red flags,’ even if 
he was on inquiry notice and did not make inquiry before redeeming.”  Id. at 849 (emphasis in original). 
186 Id. at 852. 
187 Mark Hosenball, Made Money with Madoff? Don’t Count on Keeping It, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 2009, at 9 
(noting that an analysis by the KL Gates law firm, which represents victims of the earlier fraud, claimed the 
Bayou case "provide[s] instructive guidance to [Madoff] investors and other affected parties").  
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What the contractual clawback does in effect is eliminate the distinction 
between winning and losing investors, since all investors would be treated 
similarly under the provision.  The net result is that the risk of fraud in any 
investment would be more equally allocated among the investors.   Such a 
risk distribution spread arguably reflects more accurately what the 
reasonable investor would have expected in the first instance,188 but which 
expectation turns out to be false and can be restored post facto only to a 
limited extent.  Clawbacks in investment contracts therefore operate to 
ensure that investors’ expectations concerning risk allocation are not short-
changed.   
2. The Structure of Contractual Clawbacks 
We believe clawback provisions would benefit good faith investors on 
balance if adopted into the standard boilerplate of investment contracts.  
Here, we propose, as one example, language for such a clause: 
In the event of the investment fund becoming insolvent because of fraud, 
the investor agrees that any payments received by the investor under the fund 
representing any amount of principal invested may be recovered by an 
appointed Representative and deposited in a central repository for subsequent 
redistribution to all investors in amounts pro-rated according to the amount of 
principal invested by the particular investor. 189
A potential complication, however, is that there is typically no 
contractual privity among the investors themselves.190  Rather, the 
investment structure usually consists of individual, separate contracts 
between each investor and the investment fund.191  Since the contractual 
clawback would bind only the particular parties to the contract, an investor 
would be bound under the provision to surrender all funds received without 
the assurance that other investors will do the same.  In essence, the 
contractual clawback as rendered above would function as a third-party 
beneficiary contract.192
188 It may be argued that the reasonable investor may also and instead expect that any payments received and 
already spent by the investor should not be recoverable.  Such a position again assumes the perspective of the 
innocent winning investor.  However, the investor in general will not know ex ante whether she will turn out to be 
a winning or losing investor.     
189 The contractual clawback is limited to payments representing any amount of the principal invested since 
any payments in excess of that amount represents fictitious profits and will be treated as fraudulent transfers for 
redistribution not just to losing investors but all other creditors.  See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
190 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (4th ed. 2008); Cf. Cheney v. Powell, 15 S.E. 750 (Ga. 1892) 
(discussing privity of contract in context of fraud). 
191 Id. 
192 See generally Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).  Under the Restatement approach, for example, a third party may recover if 
it is the ‘intended beneficiary’ of the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). To satisfy 
this requirement, the third party must show, among other things, that allowing it a contract remedy will ‘effectuate 
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  One way of addressing the lack of contractual privity would be to 
qualify the contractual clawback with a reciprocal clause so that only 
investors with similar provisions in their investment contracts would be 
permitted to enforce the clawback.193  For example, the sample contractual 
clawback above might limit the beneficiaries of the subsequent re-
distribution to investors with contractual clawbacks in their investment 
contracts, reading as follows: 
In the event of the investment fund becoming insolvent because of fraud, 
the investor agrees that any payments received by the investor under the fund 
representing any amount of principal invested may be recovered by an 
appointed Representative and deposited in a central repository for subsequent 
redistribution among those investors whose investment contracts contain 
similarly-rendered clawback provisions in amounts pro-rated according to the 
amount of principal invested by the particular investor. 
It is, of course, entirely possible that any clawback provision in the 
particular investment contract is a standard clause in all investment 
contracts entered into by the investment fund with its investors, so that a 
clawback would by default be included in all contracts.  Indeed, the 
investment fund would appear to have little incentive to remove such a 
clawback since it reallocates the risk of loss only as among the investors, 
and has no impact on its bottom line.194  If in fact the contractual clawback 
becomes a standard provision, the problems arising from the lack of privity 
would be much diminished, as would the need accordingly for reciprocal 
clawbacks.  
3.  The Desirability of Contractual Clawbacks 
Thus far, we have assumed that investors will find contractual 
the intention of the parties.’ Id. 
193 An example of a reciprocal provision is the statutory provision regarding the alien’s privilege to sue:  
(a) Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States 
the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court's 
jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C. § 2502 (2006).  An illustration of its operation can be found in the case of Henriquez & Gornell, Inc. v. 
United States where the court noted that a Panamanian citizen could sue the US defendant because the “Republic 
of Panama accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against the Republic in its courts. 
Therefore, under the reciprocal provision of Title 28 U.S.C. 2502 (Alien's Privilege to Sue) plaintiff is entitled to 
bring its contract claim against the defendant in this court.” 180 Ct. Cl. 1040, 1049-50 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
194 It may be argued, however, that including such contractual clawbacks may have the effect of portraying 
the investment fund in a bad light to the extent it suggests that the fund is in fact a Ponzi scheme, in which case 
the fund would have an incentive to exclude such provisions.  However, given the notoriety of the Madoff  
scheme and the fact that it had maintained the patina of  respectability for the many years it was in operation, the 
market presumably expects investors to treat any and all funds with healthy skepticism, in which case the 
inclusion of contractual clawbacks will be regarded as a standard precautionary measure.     
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clawbacks desirable because they will want a more even distribution of the 
risk of loss.  This may not be true, however, of all investors.  Because the 
winning investor in a situation not involving contractual clawbacks (and 
who thus gets to keep payments received up to the amount of the principal 
invested) will nevertheless suffer a comparatively smaller loss than the 
investor who gets a pro-rata distribution as a result of a contractual 
clawback, there may be investors who would prefer to “gamble” on the 
odds of ending up a winning investor and thereby reject such a clawback 
provision. 
It bears note, however, that the comparative upside here is as minimal as 
the downside is significant — the winning investor at best breaks even and 
does not get to keep any profits whereas the losing investor may forgo the 
entire principal invested.  As such, and since it is not possible in general to 
determine ex ante whether one will be a winning or losing investor, we 
believe it fair to assume that in general the rational investor will have the 
incentive to include a clawback in its investment contract.195
Whether investors desire clawbacks is a separate question from whether 
clawbacks are desirable from a public policy perspective.  However, to the 
extent we agree that equally innocent victims of a fraud should not bear the 
resulting loss unequally simply because of pure circumstance — a 
conclusion that courts themselves have reached196 — the two questions, and 
therefore their answers, converge. 
Further, the disparate outcome as between winning and losing investors 
may provide an investor the incentive to delay disclosing any post-
investment discovery of such fraud at least until the investor recoups its 
principal.  Conversely, because the investor subject to a contractual 
clawback will generally stand to recover a greater amount the earlier the 
fraud is discovered, the incentive structure is reversed in favor of disclosure 
at the earliest possible time. Also, winning investors currently have no 
incentive to be involved in the bankruptcy and indeed may actively avoid 
participation, thereby potentially depriving the trustee of useful information 
about the fraud.197  Indeed, winning investors in the Madoff fraud are 
apparently being advised to avoid litigation, and “to stay off the radar 
195 It may be the case that the initial investors in a smaller fund will in fact be aware of their status as such, 
and will not have the incentive to agree to contractual clawbacks.  Presumably, however, such investors will 
constitute a small proportion of the investor population.  Also, to the extent that such investors are put on notice of 
of fraudulent behavior with regard to the fund, which may be more likely under these circumstances, all payments 
made to them may be recoverable in any event as fraudulent transfers under an actual fraud recovery theory since 
they will be unable to assert a good faith defense.  See supra  notes 141, 160-62 and accompanying text.     
196 See, e.g., supra notes 174-75, and accompanying text. 
197 Cf. Christine Seib, Madoff Winners Stash Their Profits, AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 16, 2009, 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,25192402-5017996,00.html?from=marketwatch_rss 
(“Investors facing the clawback are confused about whether to submit a claim for compensation from the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation . . . Jason Cowart, a partner with Pomerantz, a New York-based class-
action specialist, said that clients were ‘deeply concerned’ at the prospect of losing more money in a clawback.”). 
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screen of the trustee who is figuring out how to pursue the Madoff firm's 
remaining assets—including potential ‘clawback’ recaptures of purported 
profits paid to early investors.”198
It may, however, be the case that the more equitable reallocation of risk 
resulting from the use of contractual clawbacks results in a generally less 
vigilant investor, since the reallocation reduces the risk of catastrophic loss 
for any individual investor.  Even if so, that is arguably an acceptable price 
for using contractual clawbacks since there is no assurance that maintaining 
current levels of vigilance would in fact result in earlier discoveries of fraud 
— witness the SEC investigation debacle in Madoff199 — whereas it is a 
certainty that when fraud is discovered, all innocent investors will be treated 
on an equal footing under a regime of contractual clawbacks.  
III. A DOCTRINE OF CLAWBACKS 
As noted in the introduction, the media and other commentators have 
used the term “clawback” extensively in the past few months, but in a 
reflexive way, with no consensus as to what is meant by the term.200
“Clawback” has been generally used to refer to any action for recoupment 
of a loss.  Meanwhile, “clawback” has taken on narrow meanings as terms 
of art within specialized corners of legal doctrine.  For example, 
“clawbacks” have been used in agreements between venture capitalists to 
spread profits and losses among funds,201 to describe the effect of 
federalism on Medicare regulations,202 the taxation of REITs and other real 
estate investment vehicles, and have a specialized meaning in the 
extraterritorial application of a nation’s laws.203  Finally, a “clawback 
agreement” also has a meaning in the context of electronic discovery, 
referring to an instance where the parties make a prospective agreement that 
any information inadvertently and inappropriately disclosed during the 
198 See Martha Neil, Some Madoff Investors Made Money—And Are Now Lying Low,  A.B.A.J. LAW NEWS 
NOW, Jan. 23, 2009, http://abajournal.com/news/some_madoff_investors_made_moneyand_are_now_lying_low. 
199 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g. Robert P. Bartlett, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 
54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 37, 73-4 (2006) (describing “clawbacks” as used in venture capital arrangements; applied as 
a term of art in venture contracts to ensure that a venture capitalist “receives no more than her specified 
percentage of fund profits upon the termination of a fund.”). 
202 See, e.g. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D 
“Clawback” Example, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79 (2007) (describing “clawback” in the healthcare 
context as a federal government provision that places a condition on states’ receipt of Medicare funds); Nicole 
Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare 
Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 445 (2008) (same). 
203 See, e.g. Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 
1492, n.3 (2008) (describing “clawback” as a statute that enables a defendant who paid multiple damages in a 
foreign country to recover those multiple damages from plaintiff). 
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discovery process will be returned.204
Notwithstanding this plethora of references, the standard contracts 
treatise contains nary a section, never mind a chapter, on the elusive 
“clawback.”205  And even though the term is not of recent provenance, there 
is little sign of a consensus on “clawback doctrine” to speak of, since the 
term has been subject to neither rigorous analytical scrutiny nor definition 
and exposition.  Thus, the challenge for this Article in proposing a doctrine 
of clawbacks is to determine where one might find clawbacks in a contracts 
treatise, what the chapter on clawbacks would say, and how it would relate 
to other established bodies of contract doctrine.  
We begin the exercise by identifying what appear to be two distinctive 
features common to many applications of the term “clawback.”  The first 
feature, adumbrated in its very name, is that a clawback is a recovery device 
that is potentially draconian but justifiable under the circumstances that 
trigger the clawback because of an inherent unfairness that would otherwise 
prevail.  The second feature, as evidenced in our examination above of 
clawbacks with respect to executive compensation and Ponzi schemes, is 
that clawbacks are generally more effective when they operate 
prospectively rather than retroactively. 
Accordingly, in constructing a framework within which to analyze 
clawbacks, we advance below a definition that we believe not only takes 
account of these features, but that encompasses many of the term’s current 
applications.  Relying on that definition, we then examine the nature of 
clawbacks, which explains in turn their function and necessity, and also 
why clawbacks are that much more effective when employed prospectively 
rather than retroactively.  We then go on to examine the implications of 
such clawback provisions on other areas of contract doctrine.  We conclude 
this section by discussing the relative merits and drawbacks of bottom-up 
versus top-down solutions, and the role of government in mandating 
prospective clawbacks in certain situations.   
A.  A Proposed Definition 
To lay a foundation for the doctrine, we propose that a clawback be 
204 See, e.g. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The 
Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 357 
(2008) (clawback in context of discovery refers to “agreement regarding a procedure for retrieving privilege 
information that has been inadvertently produced in the course of discovery.”). 
205 Although it is always difficult to find a citation for a negative proposition like this one, the authors did a 
quick survey of the contracts casebooks in their respective offices, including E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ET AL.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2008); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS CASES,
DISCUSSIONS, AND PROBLEMS (2008); RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINE (3rd ed. 2008) and 
did not find chapters or significant discussion of anything related to clawbacks in the books.  Likewise, the 
authors also consulted their textbooks on business associations / corporate law and did not find the term there 
either. 
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defined as a right to, or action for, the restitution of unfair enrichment that 
is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing applicable law.  As used 
here, the term “unfair enrichment” shares certain features with but also 
appears to vary in other respects from the traditional concept of unjust 
enrichment.  The traditional concept of unjust enrichment focuses on 
disgorgement from the breaching party.206  In the words of one leading 
commentator, the underlying premise of unjust enrichment is that “gains 
produced through another’s loss are unjust and should be restored.”207
Unfair enrichment, like unjust enrichment, can apply to those situations 
where the person unfairly enriched is not responsible for the underlying 
wrongdoing or event leading to the unfair enrichment.  For example, the 
innocent winning investor in Ponzi schemes who is not responsible for the 
fraud is nevertheless subject to the clawback of fraudulent conveyance 
laws.208  To take an example from the executive compensation context, an 
AIG executive who did not directly work on mortgage-backed securities or 
credit default swaps but received a bonus would still have to surrender 90% 
of the bonus if the pending bill passes.209
Unfair enrichment also, however, extends to those situations where the 
enrichment cannot readily be said to be unjust (per unjust enrichment 
principles) insofar as the person unfairly enriched has a legal pre-existing 
right to payment.210  In essence, clawbacks generally target certain 
inequities that are not wholly legally cognizable or relevant because they 
are in tension with independent legal rights that already justified or allowed 
for such inequities to exist in the first place.  And thus while it is unfair that 
the losing investor in a Ponzi scheme will suffer a comparatively greater  
loss than the winning investor when both are equally blameless, recognizing 
that inequity is in tension with the fact that the winning investor has a 
contractual right to the payments received as well as a restitutionary claim 
for the principal investment.211  Similarly, it seems unfair that an executive 
at AIG could walk away with a bonus when the company he had a 
responsibility to assist is failing. Nonetheless under existing law making an 
equitable claim under these circumstances is problematic as it must tackle 
the executive’s original contractual claim to the bonus.212
It may be that as sketched out above, unfair enrichment could be 
206 JOSEPH D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 599-605 (4th ed. 1998). 
207 John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974). 
208 See supra Part II (A) 
209 See supra notes 67-74, and accompanying text. 
210 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 
2000) (“Unjust enrichment is enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis: it results from a transfer that the law 
treats as ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in ownership rights.”). 
211 See supra Part II(A). 
212 See supra notes 67-74, and accompanying text. 
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regarded as a variant, albeit an unfamiliar one, of unjust enrichment.213
Regardless, we think it is useful here to designate the concept separately to 
delineate those features of clawbacks that not only identify them but that 
also explain their nature. 
B.  The Nature of Clawbacks 
As defined above, a clawback addresses inequities that cannot easily be 
resolved by existing remedies under the law because of countervailing legal 
rights independently supporting such inequities.  Accordingly, absent the 
clawback, the unfair enrichment will stand.  Although the lack of legal 
remedies ordinarily connotes the absence of a cognizable legal wrong, such 
a conclusion does not sit well in situations involving unfair enrichment, and 
appears to be out of step with prevailing notions of fairness.  To the extent 
we think that these particular notions of fairness should be honored, i.e., 
that these are inequitable situations that need redress notwithstanding the 
countervailing legal rights, we would have to look to clawbacks to override 
such countervailing rights so as to allow for restitution of the unfair 
enrichment. 
For example, although an individual AIG executive may be blameless 
and have otherwise valid contractual rights to the bonus, the payment of the 
bonus is seen to be unfair because of the notion that bonuses should not be 
decoupled from a company’s performance, particularly where taxpayer 
money is involved.214  We would have to turn to a retroactive clawback to 
override the contractual rights in this situation in order to prevent unfair 
enrichment of the executive. 
Thus, clawbacks function to bridge the gap in remedies under prevailing 
law for addressing unfair enrichment, or perhaps more accurately, to 
manage the claim of right preventing the restitution of unfair enrichment.  
Analyzed in these terms, we can now explain by reference to their function 
why prospective clawbacks are generally more effective than retroactive 
213 One might argue, for instance, that unfair enrichment is consistent with unjust enrichment if we note the 
views of Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, the reporters of the first Restatement in Restitution.  They cautioned 
that restitution law responds only imperfectly to the basic premise of unjust enrichment and that institutional 
limitations and historical accidents that render it “impossible to be just to one without being unjust to the other” 
prevent the perfect embodiment of “the fundamental conception of restitution” into rules.  Warren A. Seavey & 
Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 213 L.Q. REV. 29, 29, 31-32, 36-37 (1938).  See also LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY &
GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 14 (Gareth Jones ed., 6th ed. 2002) (unjust enrichment is a “principle 
of justice which the law recognizes and gives effect to in a wide variety of claims”).  Alternatively, one might 
paint broader strokes by postulating, as Peter Linzer does, that the prevention of unjust enrichment should serve as 
a source for applying “rough justice” in individual cases when normally sound rules produce unsatisfactory 
results.  See Peter Linzer, Rough Justice:  A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 695 (2001). Cf. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 13 (stating that Linzer’s 
position “is indefensible because . . . “‘[t]here is nothing both unique to restitution and common to all subjects of 
restitution that justifies a greater disregard of rules than judges would countenance in other areas of law.’”) 
(citation omitted).  
214 Id..
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clawbacks.  Prospective clawbacks are those clawbacks that are introduced 
before the claim of right to the benefits or enrichment has arisen.  For 
instance, some companies, like Dell, are prospectively writing provisions 
into their executive compensation contracts that would recover or cancel 
bonus awards in the event of restatement of financial results.215   In contrast, 
retroactive clawbacks are those clawbacks that, similar to the proposed 90% 
tax on bonuses, are imposed after the contractual right to the bonuses has 
arisen and the benefits have been conferred. 
Our earlier examination of clawbacks in the context of executive 
compensation and Ponzi schemes indicated that the use of prospective 
clawbacks — writing clawbacks directly into the original contract — was 
preferable to and more effective than that of retroactive clawbacks —  
statutory provisions that might retroactively tax a bonus, for example, or the 
fraudulent conveyance laws.  The reason for this difference in result lies in 
the corresponding difference between their respective approaches to 
managing the legal impediment preventing the restitution of unfair 
enrichment.   
As defined above, clawbacks address unfair enrichment that is 
otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing applicable law.  Since such 
prevailing applicable law justifies or allows for the inequity at issue, any 
efforts to cure the inequity retroactively have to confront head-on the 
particular legal rights that maintained that inequity initially.  Conversely, 
efforts to prevent the inequity prospectively avoid such potential 
confrontation to the extent that they remove or modify the nature of such 
rights from their inception.  In this way, there is little or no legal 
impediment to begin with that would prevent the restitution of any unfair 
enrichment that exists. 
For example, in the context of Ponzi schemes, while the retroactive 
clawback of fraudulent conveyance laws is in tension with the winning 
investor’s contractual and restitutionary claim,216 such tension is not present 
when employing prospective contractual clawbacks.  If there is a 
prospective clawback provision in the original contract, the winning 
investor no longer has those contractual and restitutionary claims under 
specified unfair enrichment circumstances, because they were modified by 
the clawback provision in the investor agreement.  Likewise, while we 
could try to implement retroactive clawbacks like the pending tax bill to 
attempt to recover bonus payments made to AIG executives, the tax bill is 
problematic because it must contend with existing contractual rights to such 
bonuses, not to mention overcoming the concomitant constitutional 
215 See Appendix A, infra. 
216 See supra Part II(A).. 
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rights.217  In contrast, introducing prospective clawbacks will mean that 
such contractual rights are modified automatically under the specified 
circumstances of unfair enrichment to allow for the recovery of the unfair 
restitution as represented by the bonuses.218
Thus, the very nature of clawbacks indicates that prospective rather than 
retroactive clawbacks will in general prove to be the more effective tool for 
addressing the unfair enrichment at issue.  So far, this section has 
concentrated on defining the term “clawback,” and arguing that prospective 
clawbacks will be a far more effective way of addressing the various unfair 
enrichment concerns that arise in executive compensation and Ponzi 
schemes.  We turn in the next section to a slightly different question — 
what impact would clawback provisions have on other concepts within 
contract law doctrine?   
C.  Implications of Clawbacks for Contract Doctrine 
1. Reconciling the Doctrine 
Clawback provisions could be categorized in varying ways within 
existing contract doctrine.  One such “doctrinal home” for clawbacks would 
be the realm of conditions.  Under the definition in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, a condition only refers to a contract that already 
exists.  Further, the Restatement (Second) limits a condition to an event that 
must occur before a duty of performance arises.219  However, prior common 
law tradition did recognize “an event that extinguishes a duty that has 
already arisen,” in the form of what was known as a condition 
subsequent.220  While the Restatement (Second) has eliminated conditions 
subsequent as they are considered “unusual,” and refers only to 
“conditions,” this terminology and analytical framework may be useful for 
our present purposes.221
To illustrate how a clawback provision could be categorized as a 
condition subsequent, consider an example from the executive 
compensation context.  A hypothetical contract between the corporation and 
the executive might provide a certain level of bonus.  The obligation to pay 
out the bonus to the employee would be conditioned on the company’s 
stock price reaching a particular level.  Reaching that performance goal 
would therefore be a condition precedent to payment of the bonus or grant 
217 See supra note 73, and accompanying text. 
218 Id. 
219 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 523 (3rd ed. 1999). 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has moved away from distinguishing a condition 
precedent and condition subsequent, it would appear that the distinction may have some vitality for our current 
purposes.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 230 & § 224, Reporters’ Note. 
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of stock.  Once that performance goal has been reached, a legal obligation 
to pay the bonus attaches.  However, let us also assume that the original 
contract additionally included a clawback provision that is triggered in the 
event that the financial benchmarks were later found to have been reached 
through fraudulent accounting, in the form of a material restatement of 
financial results.222  Such a clawback provision would then operate as a 
condition subsequent.  Even though the legal duty to pay the bonus had 
technically arisen when the stock price was reached, it would be 
extinguished by the “trigger” to the clawback, which would be the 
restatement of financial results.             
Another way to think about the role of clawback provisions within 
contract doctrine would be to see them as a form of stipulated damages.  
Parties may agree in advance to an amount of money payable in the event of 
breach of contract.  In essence, this allows the parties to re-write the default 
rules for contract damages by prior agreement.  An important limitation on 
stipulated damages, however, is that they cannot be so large that they have 
an in terrorem effect, lest they be classified as a penalty.223  If a clause is 
“condemned as a penalty,” a court will hold that the provision is 
unenforceable.224
One way this view of clawbacks as stipulated damages might play out 
can be illustrated by the example of a contractual clawback provision that is 
triggered in the event that an executive engages in misconduct.225  Let us 
assume in this instance that performance benchmarks are met, and the 
bonus is paid to the employee.  Unfortunately in prior weeks, the executive 
had “invested” millions of dollars gambling the company’s money away in 
Las Vegas, a result that would doubtless be deemed “misconduct.”  At that 
point, the misconduct creates a breach and requires activation of the 
clawback provision to recover the bonus that had been paid.  In this 
example, the stipulated damages amount is the amount of the bonus.226  If 
this result is too harsh or draconian, it may be challenged and held 
unenforceable, in the same way that a penalty clause might be challenged 
and invalidated under the standard doctrinal dichotomy of liquidated 
damages versus penalties. 
222 See infra Appendix A (categorizing various clawback in executive compensation contracts based on 
triggering events, one of which might be material restatement of financial results). 
223 FARNSWORTH, supra note 219 at 841-3.  
224 Id. at 843. 
225 See infra Appendix A (categorizing various clawback in executive compensation contracts based on 
triggering events, one of which might be material restatement of financial results). 
226 Of course, one could argue that the company could turn around and sue its agent for fraud, and that if the 
company was unwilling to do so, a shareholder could bring a derivative action to force the company to act.  
However, bringing a tort action, especially one for fraud (requiring a pleading with particularity) and scienter, is 
more difficult to bring than a straight contract claim.   
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Ultimately, clawback provisions could have an effect on many of the 
other significant doctrinal areas that concern the allocation of risk within 
contracts.  Some of the more salient areas that might be affected would be 
conditions more generally, as well as defenses, including mistake,227
impracticability, and frustration of purpose, the application of which would 
all depend on notions of allocation of the risk. 
2.  Relational Contract Theory and Executive Compensation 
Clawback provisions may also impact contract doctrine on a more 
theoretical level.  Such provisions in the context of executive compensation 
lend support to the relational contract theory as opposed to, say, the 
classical model of contracting.   The classical model of contracting views 
the behavior of contracting as involving a series of discrete contracts 
between rational actors in a competitive marketplace who employ contracts 
as a way to allocate risks.  Under this model, the contract may specify 
which party bears the risk of the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of 
particular events, and sophisticated parties bargain in order to place a risk 
upon that party that is the least-cost avoider. 228
In contrast, relational theory, as described by Professors Ian MacNeil229
and Stewart Macaulay230 seeks to put the contracting parties’ interactions 
into a larger social context.  Instead of seeing contracts as one-off discrete 
transactions, relational theory describes patterns of reciprocal behavior, 
often over a period of years, between repeat players.231
Clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts, through their 
very structure, rule out the possibility of a short-term relationship.  Because 
certain events that could occur at time in the future may trigger the 
reclamation of the benefit conferred, a contract with a clawback provision 
by its nature cannot be a one-off transaction. 232  A contract with a clawback 
term serves to link the parties to each other and to incentivize executives to 
227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981). 
228 For a thorough treatment of the classical model of contract, as well as other theoretical perspectives on 
contracts, see Kojo Yelpaala, Legal Consciousness and Contractual Obligations, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 193, 
209-13 (2008). 
229 See, e.g. Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 
881 (2000); Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483 (1985). 
230 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the 
Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 793 (2000).  
231 See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (context important 
in long-term contractual relationship where parties in effect acted as partners); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. 
Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (context important in determining terms where Royster had been a 
purchaser and then became seller). 
232 Of course, one could argue that the actual performance period under a clawback is simply an extension of 
the original time period; and that in fact, the clawback is just one more way of extending the period for 
performance.  However, as discussed in the portion on conditions subsequent, supra notes 219-222 and 
accompanying text, the fact is that most of these contracts contemplate a time period after one of the parties has 
already finished rendering their obligations under the agreement. 
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perform over longer periods of time.       
From these questions of contract doctrine, we turn now to a final 
question, which is how these prospective clawback measures might be 
implemented.  In addressing this question, the following section considers 
whether their adoption will be wholly voluntary or alternatively achieved 
with the assistance of the legislature, administrative agencies, or courts. 
 D.  Bottom-Up or Top-Down Approaches to Clawbacks? 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, renewed calls for government 
regulation have already ensued.  Professor Joseph Grundfest analogizes the 
process of lawmaking in the securities area as a reactive pattern that he 
likens to the evolutionary biology theory of punctuated equilibrium.233  In 
evolutionary biology, sudden and drastic changes take place in response to a 
“high pressure” event.234  Grundfest likens the Great Depression and the 
Enron failure to extreme events that forced securities law to evolve at a 
rapid pace.235  In the case of the Great Depression, the regulatory response 
to the stock market crash created our system of public reporting and 
disclosure.  As a response to several massive accounting frauds, Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, much of which directly responds to events 
at Enron.236
Certainly, the financial crisis of Fall 2008 is of such magnitude that one 
wonders whether a top-down regulatory solution is needed in order to 
prevent the vicissitudes of the financial cycle — both those gyrations that 
are irrationally exuberant as well as their converse, the inevitable troughs.  
At the same time, we should not fall into the trap of only regulating in 
response to scandal.237  Solutions and policy policies should be 
contemplated and analyzed before problems arise. Analysts have not had 
time yet to react to the financial crisis — or to think through fully any of its 
root causes.  For now, it is enough to say that we are in more of a “reactive” 
position in responding to the financial crises in general, not just the current 
situation.  
One alternative, which we have discussed throughout this Article, is to 
write clawback provisions directly into contracts on a prospective basis.  As 
we have described extensively throughout this Article, attorneys for 
233 Joseph Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN.
J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 2 (2002). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Rosen, supra note 48, at 2910 (describing initial dialogue about propriety and desirability of regulating in 
response to scandal). 
19-Aug-09] Clawbacks 43 
investors have been trying to cobble these types of clawback remedies 
together retroactively based on equitable principles.  Obviously, it would be 
easier for attorneys to implement these types of remedies if they were 
clearly written prospectively into the investment contract, in the context of 
hedge funds, or if clawback provisions were clearly written into the contract 
between the corporation and the executive.  This is more of a “bottom up” 
approach to reform,238 with incremental changes in individual contracts, 
which then generate a body of law surrounding clawback provisions, their 
substance, their interpretation, and their enforcement.   
In contract law, specialized clauses like the clawback we discuss here 
serve important functions.  The more a particular clause is used, the more 
likely it is to be included in “standard” boilerplate, and to have a body of 
doctrine and particular modes of judicial interpretation.  One example 
would be the humble (yet heroic) “force majeure” clause, which allocates 
risk between the parties upon the instance of a catastrophic event.239  Major 
casebooks include a discussion of force majeure clauses, normally including 
them as part of their discussion of frustration of purpose or commercial 
impracticability.240  Other examples of such specialized provisions include 
merger and integration clauses (normally included in discussion of the parol 
evidence rule), indemnification clauses, and provisions relating to 
warranties.  In all of these instances, the clauses acquire particular meanings 
as they become more commonplace and routine. 
It may be that investors will begin demanding these types of protections 
independent of any regulation.  On the other hand, we have seen all too 
frequently the principal-agent problem manifesting itself in the corporate 
context.  The gap between the shareholders and the board of directors can, 
all too often, result in a lack of accountability for the board and the 
managers of the publicly traded company.241  Between the public outcry 
over executive bonuses, and the motivation this proxy season to write 
clawbacks into executive compensation contracts going forward, it is 
entirely possible that there will be sufficient momentum present to solve the 
problem.  
238 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 
933 (2006) (“Democratic legal systems make law in one of two ways: by abstracting general principles from the 
decisions made in individual cases (from the bottom up); or by declaring general principles through a centralized 
authority that are to be applied in individual cases (from the top down)”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad 
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 891 (2006). 
239 Often the performance of both parties will be called off under the force majeure clause if the event in 
question is triggered.  See Kama Rippa Music, Inc. v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975) (interpreting force 
majeure clause). 
240 See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., supra note 219, at 842-4.
241 Calls for regulation are completely justified in the hedge funds, the failure of oversight, the failure of 
gatekeepers — attorneys and accountants — to spot the Madoff fraud is shocking and justifies reform.  Similarly, 
the idea that former executives who took extreme — and perhaps unjustified risks — could profit while ordinary 
shareholders and taxpayers had to absorb massive losses — seemed offensive, and again, provide a justification 
for additional top-down regulation. 
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It is also possible that legislative or administrative action by the SEC is 
required in order to ensure the inclusion of clawbacks in executive 
compensation arrangements.  This is not an unusual proposal; there are 
many laws (securities related and otherwise) that mandate particular 
disclosures, or specific language in a contract in order to comply with a 
statute.  For example, mandatory disclosures are required in certain real 
estate transactions.242  But one need not even stray that far from the 
corporate context in order to find such examples of mandatory disclosures.  
For example, in the sale of stock in a private placement, the contract for 
such sale must disclose particular limitations on resale of the securities, 
with particular legends informing the purchaser that the stock is 
restricted.243  At this point, these provisions are well-accepted, and indeed, 
expected in this context.  With so many disclosures already part of the 
“landscape of contract” in the securities arena, mandating an additional set 
of prospective contract terms concerning clawback provisions is eminently 
achievable.   
CONCLUSION
This Article has described, in detail, the use of contractual clawbacks in 
two different scenarios — executive compensation and Ponzi schemes.  In 
both of these situations, we have analyzed the gap in the remedies currently 
available and remarked that the gap leads to a continuing problem of unfair 
enrichment. As we have described, writing clawbacks prospectively and 
directly into contracts can provide a ready avenue for recovery.  In the 
context of executive compensation, it forces executives to align their 
interests with that of the long-term growth of the company.  In the context 
of Ponzi schemes, clawbacks present an opportunity to equalize “winning” 
and “losing” investors.  In tandem, these remedies provide an important 
way of prospectively changing the legal landscape to further the protection 
of shareholders and investors. 
242 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 78.08(b)(3) (David A. Thomas ed., 2nd ed. 1999) (California law 
mandating disclosures in real property as to condition of land, airport location, and public utilities). 
243 Securities and Exchange Act, Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008). 
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APPENDIX A: CATEGORIES OF CLAWBACKS  
IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 
The following is a categorization of clawback provisions regarding 
executive compensation, which are triggered in the event of employee bad 
faith, misconduct or fraud, or a restatement of financial results.  These 
exemplars of clawbacks have been culled from the filings of publicly-traded 
companies.  Compensation arrangements are typically disclosed in a 
company’s Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CDA), a portion of the 
company’s definitive proxy statement (Form 14A-DEF), as filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  While the content of a “clawback” 
may vary widely with the language of any particular contract, these 
categories seem to reflect the most common “triggering” events for 
recoupment.  The first category, “bad faith,” would likely be ineffectual, 
while the last category, which would allow for a clawback in the event of a 
material financial restatement, would probably have the most impact.   
A.   “Bad Faith” Conduct 
1.  McKesson Corp., Form DEF 14A, (June 23, 2008), at 32.  
Clawback Policy.  As described in the Company’s standard award 
documentation, the Compensation Committee may seek to recoup any 
economic gains from equity grants from any employee who engages in 
conduct which is not in good faith and which disrupts, damages, impairs or 
interferes with the business, reputation or employees of the Company or its 
affiliates.  
2. Ford Motor Corp., Form DEF 14A, (April 4, 2008), at 71-2.
The Plan has certain conditions which must be met prior to the 
distribution of any award in order for a participant to receive an award 
following termination of employment. These conditions include continuing 
employment with the Company or a subsidiary or, if termination was for a 
reason other than death, being available to consult and supply information 
to the Company. In addition, the participant must refrain from competitive 
activity, unless the Company approves the activity. A participant also may 
forfeit an award, including deferred amounts, for conduct contrary to the 
best interests of the Company.
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B.  Fraud or Misconduct 
1.  General Motors Corp., Form DEF 14A (April 25, 2008), at 35.
In October 2006, the GM Board adopted and announced a policy 
regarding the recoupment of unearned compensation, applicable to 
incentive compensation paid to executive officers after January 1, 2007 and 
unvested portions of awards previously granted, in situations involving 
financial restatement due to employee fraud, negligence, or intentional 
misconduct. In conjunction with this, the Committee charter was modified 
to reflect the new policy and the revised charter and policy were published 
on GM’s Web site. In addition, we added provisions to all executive 
incentive and deferred compensation plans to reference Board policies 
affecting compensation, and require that the compensation of all executives 
covered by this policy be subject to this recoupment clause. 
2.  American Express Co., Form DEF 14A, (March 14, 2008), at 32.
Policy Regarding Recoupment of Incentive Compensation.  To protect 
the shareholders’ interests, we have a policy pursuant to which we will, to 
the extent practicable, seek to recover performance-based compensation 
from any executive officer and certain other members of senior 
management in those circumstances where (i) the payment of such 
compensation was based on the achievement of financial results that were 
subsequently the subject of a restatement, (ii) in the Board’s view the 
employee engaged in fraud or misconduct that caused or partially caused 
the need for the restatement, and (iii) a smaller or no payment would have 
been made to the employee based upon the restated financial results.  
Detrimental Conduct.  To help protect our competitive position, we 
have a “detrimental conduct” policy, covering approximately 540 
executives (including the NEOs). Each covered executive is required to sign 
an agreement that requires him or her, among other provisions, to forfeit the 
pre-tax proceeds from some or all of his or her compensation received under 
the 1998 Plan and the 2007 Plan, including RSAs (and dividends paid), 
NQSOs, RSUs (and dividend equivalents paid), PGs awarded under either 
plan and, in the case of executive officers, all of his or her AIAs that were 
received up to two years prior to employment termination if he or she 
engages in conduct that is detrimental to the Company following 
employment termination. Detrimental conduct includes, for example, 
working for certain competitors, soliciting our customers or employees, or 
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disclosing our confidential information. The detrimental conduct policy is 
in addition to the obligations arising under our Code of Conduct.  
C.   Restatement of Financial Results 
1.  Cisco Systems, Inc., Form DEF 14A, (September 25, 2008), at 28. 
Following the Compensation Committee’s recommendation in March 
2008, the Board of Directors adopted a recoupment policy for cash 
incentive awards paid to executive officers under Cisco’s annual cash 
incentive plan, the EIP. In the event that there were a restatement of 
incorrect financial results, this policy would enable the Compensation 
Committee, if it determined appropriate and subject to applicable laws, to 
seek reimbursement of the incremental portion of EIP awards paid to 
executive officers in excess of the awards that would have been paid based 
on the restated financial results. Cisco’s variable cash incentive and long-
term, equity-based incentive award plans also generally provide for 
forfeiture if a named executive officer participates in activities detrimental 
to Cisco or is terminated for misconduct. Additionally, consistent with 
statutory requirements, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the 
principles of responsible oversight, and depending upon the specific facts 
and circumstances of each situation, the Compensation Committee would 
review all performance-based compensation where a restatement of 
financial results for a prior performance period could affect the factors 
determining payment of an incentive award.   
2.  Dell Inc., Form DEF 14A, (June 2, 2008), at 71-72.
Recoupment Policy for Performance Based Compensation.  If Dell 
restates its reported financial results, the Board of Directors will review the 
bonus and other awards made to the executive officers based on financial 
results during the period subject to the restatement, and to the extent 
practicable, Dell will recover or cancel any such awards based on having 
met or exceeded performance targets that would not have been met under 
the restated financial results. 
3. Exxon Mobile Corp., Form DEF 14A, (April 10, 2008), at 32.
Should the Corporation’s reported financial or operating results be subject 
to a material negative restatement within five years, the Board would seek 
to obtain from each executive officer an amount corresponding to any 
incentive award or portion thereof that the Board determines would not 
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have been granted or paid had the Corporation’s results as originally 
reported been equal to the Corporation’s results as subsequently restated. 
